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ABSTRACT 
  Cases are won and lost in discovery, yet discovery draws little 
academic attention. Most scholarship focuses on how much discovery 
to allow, not on how courts decide discovery disputes—which, unlike 
trials, occur in most cases. The growth of computer data—e-mails, 
lingering deleted files, and so forth—increased discovery cost, but the 
new e-discovery rules just reiterate existing cost-benefit 
proportionality limits that draw broad consensus among litigation 
scholars and economists. But proportionality rules are impossible to 
apply effectively; they fail to curb discovery excess yet disallow 
discovery that meritorious cases need. This Article notes 
proportionality’s flaws but rejects the consensus blaming bad 
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rulemaking or judging. Rather, proportionality requires impossible 
comparisons between discovery value and cost before parties gather 
the evidence. Like other arguments that procedural rulings should 
depend on case merits, this Article notes how discovery has more 
probative value in close cases—yet a case’s merits are unclear during 
discovery because the court cannot yet examine all the evidence. 
  In game theory terms, parties with discovery disputes cannot 
convey case merit credibly; courts have too little information, so low-
merit parties can claim high merit, and courts are compelled to act as 
if all cases of a similar type warrant similar discovery. In this “pooling 
equilibrium,” ruling the same on all cases in the “pool,” regardless of 
merit, is courts’ best strategy but a suboptimal one, yielding too much 
discovery in low-merit cases, too little in higher-merit ones. Thus, the 
quest for better discovery has disappointed not because of bad rules 
or decisions, but because courts and parties are stuck in a pooling 
equilibrium with information-timing circularity: optimal evidence 
gathering requires merits analysis, which in turn requires evidence 
gathering. 
  As a solution, courts could defer close decisions on possibly useful 
but costly evidence until meritorious cases separate from the pool, 
turning pooling into separating equilibria. Summary judgment can be 
this separation: cases going to trial after summary judgment not only 
have higher average merit than the pool of all filed cases, but are 
disproportionately likely to be the sort of close calls in which juries 
struggle to reach verdicts. No one yet has proposed post–summary 
judgment discovery to redress the costly discovery dilemma because 
summary judgment typically occurs only after all discovery, but high-
cost evidence can be an exception to that usual sequence: cases 
surviving summary judgment are close calls warranting more fact 
gathering, so some costly discovery regularly denied should be 
allowed after summary judgment. Thus, the existing debate is too 
focused on limiting the amount of discovery; it should instead focus 
more on timing costly discovery optimally, to try to limit discovery to 
cases in which it is truly needed. Existing rules give courts discretion 
to use this proposal, but a new rule could minimize the risk of 
misusing the proposal to deny more discovery. This Article concludes 
by briefly noting how economic analyses must consider the details 
and information timing of the litigation process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most litigators agree that “discovery . . . is the battleground 
where civil suits are won and lost.”1 “It is in discovery that the facts 
are developed,” sometimes leading to a dismissal of the case on 
summary judgment2 but other times to “vital evidence” that yields a 
trial win or a “favorable settlement[].”3 Discovery’s cost attests to its 
importance: in federal cases, discovery comprises half of all litigation 
costs; in the most expensive 5 percent of cases, discovery amounts to 
90 percent of litigation cost and totals 32 percent of the amount in 
controversy.4 Yet on no other topic is there more disconnect between 
 
 1. Joseph D. Steinfield & Robert A. Bertsche, Recent Developments in the Law of Access 
– 1998, 540 PLI/PAT. 53, 107 (1998); see also Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 
(2d Cir. 1990) (“Because employers rarely leave a paper trail—or ‘smoking gun’—[of] 
discriminatory intent, . . . plaintiffs often must build their cases from pieces of circumstantial 
evidence which cumulatively undercut the [defendant’s] credibility . . . . [R]efusal to compel 
[discovery] . . . deprived Hollander of evidence potentially helpful to . . . assembl[ing] such a 
quantum of circumstantial evidence . . . .” (citations omitted)); Jon W. Green & Kyle M. 
Francis, Age Discrimination in Employment: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 522 PLI/LIT. 227, 238 
(1995) (“Discovery is the most crucial phase of age discrimination actions.”). 
 2. Steinfield & Bertsche, supra note 1, at 107. 
 3. Green & Francis, supra note 1, at 238. 
 4. Thomas W. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice 
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 544–46, 548–49 (1998) (noting 
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the academy and bar; discovery controversies often are “not 
something that law professors pay a lot of attention to, but lawyers 
do.”5 Although discovery is the topic of numerous bar publications 
and conferences,6 it draws far fewer academic articles than hotter civil 
rights issues,7 even though discovery is crucial to civil rights litigation.8 
Most of the limited academic writing focuses on how much discovery 
is too much for parties to request, at least without paying more of the 
production cost.9 Academics rarely focus on how courts decide 
discovery disputes (which, unlike trials, occur in most lawsuits), 
frustrating judges and parties alike. More academic focus is critical; if 
cases are won and lost in discovery, then they are really won and lost 
in discovery decisions. 
The difficulty of discovery decisions took on a new salience once 
computerization brought litigation into a “brave new world”10 of 
costly “e-discovery” in which much evidence (perhaps 90 percent of 
corporate data) is digital, not paper,11 and in which the best evidence 
can be e-mail sent in unguarded moments12 or still-lingering “deleted” 
 
also that only 15 percent of cases had no discovery, and 46 percent of those still had informal 
evidence exchange). 
 5. Richard Marcus, Assoc. Reporter, Fed. Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules, Comment at the American Association of Law Schools 2008 Meeting, Section on Civil 
Procedure (Jan. 4, 2008). 
 6. For example, the Practicing Law Institute’s annual conference, Electronic Discovery 
and Retention Guidance for Corporate Counsel, yields a lengthy symposium issue. See 
Symposium, Electronic Discovery and Retention Guidance for Corporate Counsel 2007, 766 
PLI/LIT. 13 (2007) (17 articles); Symposium, Electronic Discovery and Retention Guidance for 
Corporate Counsel 2006, 747 PLI/LIT. 9 (2006) (13 articles); Symposium, Electronic Discovery 
and Retention Guidance for Corporate Counsel 2005, 733 PLI/LIT. 9 (2005) (14 articles). 
 7. An ExpressO search of top fifty law school specialty reviews found thirteen on 
women’s or gender issues, seven on constitutional or civil rights, and only one on litigation. 
 8. For a discussion on the need for discovery to prove hidden discriminatory intent 
circumstantially, see supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 9. For a discussion of the proposals to limit discovery and cost-shifting proposals, see infra 
Parts I.B, II.A. 
 10. Patricia A. Bronte, Managing Electronic Discovery Successfully in Insurance Coverage 
Litigation, 758 PLI/LIT. 55, 75 (2007) (arguing for attorneys to “master the brave new world of 
electronic discovery”); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World 
or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 634 (2006). 
 11. Harvey L. Kaplan, Electronic Discovery in the 21st Century: Is Help on the Way?, 733 
PLI/LIT. 65, 67 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., Siemens Solar Indus. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 93 Civ. 1126 (LAP), 1994 WL 
86368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994) (recounting the plaintiff’s discovery of e-mails “reveal[ing] 
beyond peradventure” that the defendant praised its new product yet knew it “was not 
commercially viable”). 
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incriminating files.13 In 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
clarified that “electronically stored information” (“ESI”) is 
discoverable unless it is “not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost.”14 The “reasonably accessible” limit reflects worry 
about e-discovery’s “enormous costs . . . becoming the single most 
expensive facet of litigation.”15 The cost of e-discovery has two key 
components: (1) quantity—with businesses exchanging 2.5 trillion e-
mails annually, 2 million at a typical company,16 and with computer 
files often remaining recoverable after deletion,17 the amount of 
attorney time needed to review discovery, and the potential for 
discovery disputes, has increased; and (2) inaccessibility—digital data 
“can be expensive or virtually impossible to recover” due to 
“outmoded storage media and software, and dispersion of 
information.”18 Because e-discovery can cost tens or hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in even fairly typical cases,19 “[i]t is hard to 
overstate the importance and the degree of anxiety generated by 
electronic discovery . . . . It is not just in the world of big business; it is 
in the world of organizations generally, large data producers.”20 
Yet this brave new world may not be so new. Applying old 
litigation rules “to new technology presents additional challenges,”21 
but “this is not the first time someone has argued that the discovery 
rules are no longer suitable for . . . contemporary discovery.”22 After 
all, when the federal rules were enacted, “[t]he photocopy machine 
 
 13. See Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of Pay-
Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1409–12 (2000) (recounting examples of these sorts of 
digital evidence). 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). For the details of these amendments, see infra note 74. 
 15. Bronte, supra note 10, at 59; see also Christopher S. Rugaber, E-Documents Subject to 
Stricter Storage, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 2, 2006, at 3D (noting that 
companies pay e-discovery consultants over $1 billion a year and must have lawyers review e-
mail and “things more difficult to track, like digital photos . . . [on] cell phones and information 
on removable memory cards”). 
 16. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 67. 
 17. Pulver, supra note 13, at 1409–12. 
 18. William R. Maguire, Current Developments in Federal Civil Discovery Practice: Setting 
Reasonable Limits in the Digital Era, 754 PLI/LIT. 169, 175 (2007). 
 19. See infra notes 87–88. 
 20. Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (comments of Lee H. Rosenthal, J., United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas). 
 21. Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic 
Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258 (Spring/Summer 2001). 
 22. Id. at 254. 
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did not exist,”23 and like all new technologies, it solved some problems 
but created new ones. As with the discovery-multiplying effect of 
computers, “the volume of paper created grew enormously when 
photocopies became ubiquitous.”24 At the same time, as one court 
marveled in now-quaint terms, “the modern convenience of 
photocopying lessens . . . burdensome transportation of . . . 
documents,”25 just as computers can make document exchange as easy 
as e-mailing attachments.26 
Because e-discovery is just another instance of an old problem—
technology increases costs by permitting more discovery—just as 
photocopiers led to cost-benefit proportionality limits on discovery,27 
computers led to similar limits. The resulting e-discovery rules 
paralleled existing proportionality rules, asking courts to balance 
whether good cause justifies e-discovery that imposes a high “burden 
or cost.”28 Such proportionality limits long have been prescribed by 
law and economics scholars—not just the economists most skeptical 
of litigation cost, runaway tort liability, and extortionate settlements, 
but also others proposing cost-benefit requirements that force parties 
to pay more of the cost of seeking heavy discovery.29 With contrary 
views relegated to the periphery of the economic debate, discovery 
limits are a topic of unusual consensus among civil procedure 
scholars, economists, and the judicial and other governmental bodies 
that repeatedly undertake rule changes and other efforts to rein in 
discovery.30 
Dissenting from the consensus, this Article contends that 
proportionality limits cannot be implemented effectively. Sometimes 
 
 23. Id. at 266. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Lemberger v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 76-C-552(JW), 1976 WL 834, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 1976). 
 26. See Richard Allan Horning, Electronically Stored Evidence: Answers to Some Recurring 
Questions Concerning Pretrial Discovery and Trial Usage, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1335, 1344 
(1984) (“[D]uplicati[ng] electronic data is relatively inexpensive . . . compared with the cost of 
re-inputing . . . .”). 
 27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). For a discussion of this proportionality rule, see 
infra Part I.A. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). For a discussion of this e-discovery rule, see infra Part I.A. 
 29. See infra Part II.A. 
 30. For a discussion of the proportionality amendments and reform efforts, including 
efforts by U.S. attorneys general, that preceded them, see infra notes 42–43. For a discussion of 
the Manual for Complex Litigation proposals published by Federal Judicial Center, see infra 
notes 49–51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the e-discovery amendments, see infra 
notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
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they do too little, failing to curb discovery excess or allowing costly 
discovery on meritless claims; other times they do too much, 
disallowing discovery that meritorious cases need. These opposing 
errors do not average out any more than it is on average comfortable 
to have one foot frozen and one foot on fire. Additionally, when 
product quality is hard to determine, bad products drive good ones 
out of the market;31 analogously, if bad cases get too much discovery 
and good cases too little, court dockets will have more bad cases and 
fewer good cases. Consequently, suboptimal discovery skews the mix 
of cases. 
After noting how proportionality rules have disappointed at 
regulating discovery and how e-discovery rules seem headed for a 
similar fate, this Article parts company with those blaming bad 
rulemaking or judges too timid to curb discovery.32 Rather, the 
problem is that proportionality rules ask the impossible: judges must 
decide when discovery cost is proportional to some measure of 
“value” that includes both evidence value to jury deliberation and case 
value to the parties and society. This yields a fundamental 
information-timing problem: discovery disputes occur before parties 
marshal all the evidence, so how can courts measure the value of 
particular evidence, much less case merits? Like other arguments that 
litigation procedure rulings cannot truly be independent of case 
merits,33 this Article notes how discovery has more probative value in 
close-call cases than in the strongest and weakest cases (in which 
more evidence is less likely to affect case outcome). Case merits, 
though critical to discovery decisions, typically remain hidden in a 
cloud of uncertainty during discovery because the court is not yet able 
to sift fully through the evidence and arguments. 
This Article applies economics and game theory to analyze 
courts’ decisions on litigation discovery disputes. Due to the 
information costs (including time) of assessing case merit during 
discovery, courts often cannot tell which plaintiffs’ braggadocio is 
cheap talk and which reflects real case merit. As a result, courts must 
ignore parties’ merits arguments and adjudicate discovery disputes as 
if all cases of a similar type in the pool (that is, cases arising under the 
same statute that are neither facially frivolous nor obvious winners) 
warrant similar discovery. In game theory terms, courts’ discovery 
 
 31. See infra Part II.B.3.c. 
 32. See infra Part II.B.3.c. 
 33. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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rulings should be based on claims’ merit, but merit cannot be 
communicated effectively; as a result, those rulings must be based on 
the average value of all cases in the pool. In this pooling equilibrium, 
the best available strategy for courts is to rule the same on all cases in 
a pool regardless of case merit—even though these rulings are 
suboptimal in the sense of yielding too much discovery in low-merit 
cases and too little discovery in high-merit cases. 
Under this analysis, the quest for better discovery limits has 
disappointed not because of bad decisionmaking or bad rulemaking, 
but because courts and parties are stuck in a pooling equilibrium. This 
is a fundamental information-timing problem inherent in the 
discovery stage of litigation: optimal evidence-gathering decisions 
require more merits analysis, but merits analyses require more 
evidence gathering. As in the folk song, “There’s a Hole in the 
Bucket”—in which the hole is fixable only with a machine requiring 
water poured from the broken bucket34—the problem is a classic 
circularity; the problem prevents the solution. 
Deferring close decisions on potentially useful but costly 
evidence until case merit is clearer—until meritorious cases 
distinguish themselves, turning a pooling equilibrium into a 
separating equilibrium—is one possible solution to the pooling 
equilibrium. Fortunately, litigation has such a point: after summary 
judgment. A case reaching trial, having survived summary judgment, 
has a reasonable probability of merit: even without adopting the old 
theory that tried cases have fifty-fifty odds, cases reaching trial are 
more likely than others to be close calls, and they certainly have 
higher average merit than the pool of all filed complaints. More 
evidence, like costly electronic data, has more value to the jury in 
close-call cases than in very weak or strong cases. 
Accordingly, much of the scholarly debate on discovery misses 
the mark by focusing on how much to limit costly discovery, such as 
with proportionality rules and numerical caps.35 This Article suggests 
focusing on when in litigation to allow costly discovery. Specifically, 
 
 34. Harry Belafonte and Odetta are probably the most famous pair to have sung this duet. 
HARRY BELAFONTE, A MAN AND HIS MUSIC (RCA Records 1990) (track 5). The author first 
heard it sung by muppets on The Muppet Show in the 1970s but, sadly, cannot find a video clip 
or proper citation. 
 35. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 256 (“The retrenchment effort . . . . [has] two 
themes . . . the principle of proportionality and quantitative limits . . . .”). For a discussion of 
rules applying proportionality and numerical limits, see infra notes 43, 122 and accompanying 
text. 
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decisions regarding costly discovery should be postponed until after 
summary judgment, to ensure that costly discovery is imposed only in 
cases with a greater probability of merit. Although this proposal 
might enable judges to deny or postpone more discovery, any 
discovery denied or postponed under this proposal is probably 
already denied based on judges’ proportionality discretion. Thus, the 
main utility of this proposal would be to explain how courts could 
allow more discovery, only after summary judgment, of helpful but 
costly evidence that courts often disallow and declare 
nondiscoverable. 
Nobody has suggested solving the dilemma of costly discovery 
with post–summary judgment discovery, which might seem to be a 
counterintuitive idea;36 summary judgment typically comes only after 
all discovery is completed. Unusually costly evidence should be an 
exception: surviving summary judgment means a case likely is the sort 
of close call warranting more fact gathering, so courts should allow 
truly costly discovery, like the heavy e-discovery that they commonly 
disallow, only once a case survives summary judgment.37 
Interestingly, no rule change is required to implement this 
Article’s proposal that courts revisit denials of burdensome discovery 
if a case survives summary judgment. Existing rules give courts broad 
case management authority, including power over the extent and 
sequence of discovery and summary judgment. Thus, this proposal 
could not only improve litigation discovery, but also provide a 
welcome answer to courts’ riddle of how to rule on proportionality 
without circular, premature case-merit evaluations. A new rule would 
be advisable, though, to minimize the risk of courts misusing the 
proposal to deny discovery excessively. 
This Article’s conclusion then offers a brief broader point about 
economic analysis. Fitting into a line of scholarship analyzing 
litigation as a series of points in time when information emerges, this 
Article suggests that for economic analysis of litigation to provide 
accurate diagnoses and useful recommendations, it must do more 
 
 36. The exception is that courts allow prediscovery limited-scope summary judgment 
motions in certain cases, such as those limited to governmental immunity defenses. See infra 
note 199 and accompanying text. 
 37. This Article does not discuss all discovery reforms, just one problem that cannot be 
fully fixed (the impossibility of optimal discovery decisions) and a partial fix well targeted to 
that information-timing problem (postponing some discovery until summary judgment). For a 
discussion of other proposals, such as discovery sampling or cost shifting, see infra notes 218–24 
and accompanying text. 
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than just prescribe cost-benefit comparisons; it must consider the 
timing-and-stages nature of litigation, such as by delving into the 
details of discovery, prelitigation settlement, and other events short of 
trials and dispositive motions. 
I.  THE RISE OF PROPORTIONALITY LIMITS ON LITIGATION 
DISCOVERY—AND THEIR DISAPPOINTING RESULTS 
A.  What Is Old Is New Again: Proportionality Requirements as a 
Solution to Tech-Driven Discovery Excess 
The most surprising aspect of the e-discovery rules is how unnew 
those rules are. This is not the first time new rules have targeted 
discovery excesses that new technology facilitated. The federal rules 
long have prescribed “liberal discovery”38 that the producing party 
must pay for itself39 and a broad relevance standard—that 
discoverable evidence need not be admissible, only “reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”40 These 
principles arose in an older, prephotocopier era, when typical 
discovery was just on-premises review of original evidence.41 
Like the computer revolution, the older photocopier revolution 
facilitated the higher levels of discovery that still exist—massive 
document demands and “paper dump” responses—prompting a 
powerful countermovement at the highest levels of the legal 
establishment, including the U.S. attorney general and an American 
 
 38. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (disallowing the 
prediscovery dismissal of a discrimination claim because the federal rules’ “simplified notice 
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions . . . to 
dispose of unmeritorious claims”). 
 39. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“[T]he presumption 
is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests . . . .”). 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351 (noting that 
discovery relevance “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that 
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the 
case”). 
 41. The early discovery decisions following the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure illustrate this limited nature of early-to-mid–twentieth century discovery. See, e.g., 
Harris v. Sunset Oil Co., 2 F.R.D. 93, 93 (W.D. Wash. 1941) (ordering documents produced “at 
[parties’] respective places of business during reasonable office hours”); Compagnie 
Continentale D’Importation v. Pac. Argentine Braz. Line, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 
1940) (“[Document] inspection should be held at defendant’s convenience . . . at its place of 
business.”); Gielow v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 425, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) 
(ordering party “to exhibit the documents . . . but at the office of the complainant; not to be 
removed therefrom”). 
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Bar Association “Special Committee on Abuse of Discovery.”42 The 
federal judges on the Judicial Conference ultimately enacted the 
proportionality rule requiring that discovery 
shall be limited by the court . . . [if] the burden or expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the 
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, 
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the 
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.43 
The sense of urgency behind proportionality limits has not 
dissipated; the Supreme Court in 1998 “signalled the importance of 
the proportionality concept in some cases by quoting portions of Rule 
26(b)(2) and observing that ‘[it] vests the trial judge with broad 
discretion to tailor discovery narrowly.’”44 
The timing of the earlier proportionality movement is striking: 
coming in the 1980s and 1990s, it shortly preceded the widespread 
adoption in the 1990s and 2000s of e-mail, networked computers, and 
the Internet. To be sure, although computers were less ubiquitous 
before the 1990s, major companies45 and government entities46 long 
have computerized their data. But courts often ignored cost-based 
objections to computer discovery, blaming computer-using parties for 
“a system of record-keeping which conceals rather than discloses 
relevant records, or makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate 
 
 42. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and 
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1332 (1978) (noting that the Judicial Conference 
and American Bar Association Committee had the “primary concern . . . [of] curbing the cost of 
discovery and reducing the ways discovery can be abused”); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery 
Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 753–68 (1998) (recounting drives to limit discovery); 
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal 
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 744–45 (1998) (discussing the proportionality 
amendments that later became part of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)). 
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 44. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2008.1, at 54 (2d ed. Supp. 2008) (quoting Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)). 
 45. See, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestern Indemn., 88 F.R.D. 191, 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio 1980) 
(granting the plaintiffs, who had claimed a widespread “pattern or practice” of discrimination, a 
search that could take thousands of hours of the defendant’s “computer systems, including 
access to and information about . . . equipment, raw data, programs, data management systems, 
and the by-products of their analyses”). 
 46. See, e.g., United States v. Greenlee, 380 F. Supp. 652, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (denying a 
criminal defendant a requested weeks-long search of Internal Revenue Service computers that 
would have created risks of security breaches, privacy violations, and “serious interruption of 
the operations of the IRS”). 
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them” and thereby rejecting parties’ “impossibility contentions 
insofar as they are grounded in the peculiar manner in which [they] 
maintain their computer systems.”47 
When computer discovery was a rarity, courts could ignore its 
cost. Once it was common, courts faced the reality of tactical demands 
for costly searches. As in the 1970s, technology raised discovery cost 
and volume,48 inspiring efforts to limit discovery. The Manual for 
Complex Litigation in 1995 recommended “a cost-benefit approach” 
to stop “fishing expedition[s],”49 proposing “conditioning particular 
discovery on payment of its costs by the party seeking it”;50 the 
Manual did not detail as broad a range of relevant factors as did later 
e-discovery proposals, but it did stress that with discovery costs 
increasing, courts should give renewed consideration to cost-shifting 
options that had not previously been in wide use.51 
Yet not all courts have followed the Manual for Complex 
Litigation,52 and one later case quickly became the leading word on e-
discovery. In 2003, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I)53 set 
out a multifactor test to determine whether discovery should be 
allowed or denied, partially allowed, or allowed conditioned upon 
cost shifting.54 The Zubulake I test essentially was a more detailed 
cost-benefit analysis comparing the costs and benefits of discovering 
the disputed evidence,55 with cost evaluated in light of the parties’ 
resources, the amount in controversy, and the “relative ability of each 
 
 47. Dunn, 88 F.R.D. at 198. 
 48. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infra notes 87–88. 
 49. Pulver, supra note 13, at 1386. 
 50. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.433 (1995). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 94 C 897, 1995 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1995) (mem.) (granting class action plaintiffs’ 
motion to compel the defendant to produce computer-stored e-mail at the defendant’s own 
expense, estimated at $50,000 to $70,000, and expressly rejecting an alternative suggested by the 
Manual of Complex Litigation). 
 53. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Judge 
Scheindlin, who authored Zubulake I, issued several later relevant opinions: Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC (Zubulake II), 230 F.R.D. 290, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC 
(Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC 
(Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 54. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
 55. Id. Factors focusing on the benefit of discovering the benefit include the following: 
“The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;” “The 
availability of such information from other sources;” “The importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation;” and “The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.” Id. 
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party to control costs.”56 Zubulake I never fully harmonized e-
discovery law and practice, however. Not qualifying as “final” orders, 
discovery rulings ordinarily are nonappealable,57 so “few trial court 
decisions regarding the scope and logistics of discovery . . . [reach] the 
appellate level.”58 Because Zubulake I and virtually all e-discovery 
opinions are nonbinding district court precedent, Zubulake I, though 
“widely regarded as the leading case authority” on e-discovery,59 has 
not drawn universal adherence.60 
Also helpful are the e-discovery reform proposals of the 
nongovernmental Sedona Conference Working Group on Best 
Practices for Electronic Document Production.61 Sedona paralleled 
the Manual for Complex Litigation and Zubulake I on some points, 
such as the permissibility of cost shifting,62 but it added other 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (authorizing appeal only of “final decisions” in cases); see also, 
e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992) (“As a general 
rule, a district court’s order enforcing a discovery request is not a ‘final order’ subject to 
appellate review. A party that seeks to present an objection to a discovery order immediately to 
a court of appeals must refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt 
order.”). 
 58. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: 
Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 378 (2000). 
 59. Benjamin D. Silbert, Note, The 2006 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Accessible and Inaccessible Electronic Information Storage Devices, Why Parties Should Store 
Electronic Information in Accessible Formats, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 18 (2007), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article14.pdf. 
 60. See, e.g., Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 
WL 1553480, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (ordering cost shifting to requesting party even 
though Zubulake I “weighs against shifting any expense” because “Zubulake is a district court 
opinion without binding authority”); Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 24 (comments of James 
C. Francis IV, J., United States District Court for the Southern District of New York) 
(discussing use of multifactor tests in e-discovery disputes and arguing that “it depends on 
whether you adopt Judge Scheindlin’s view [in Zubulake] of a hierarchy or whether you 
think . . . [the] factors will probably play out differently in different cases. I am resistant to the 
hierarchy approach because my fear is that the factor at the top of the hierarchy will almost 
always wash out the other[s]”). 
 61. WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (2d ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter SEDONA], available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/ 
TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf. Sedona produced a draft in 2003, revised it after public 
comment in 2004, updated it minimally in 2005, and produced a 2007 Second Edition 
incorporating the 2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules. See THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, 
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES AFTER THE FEDERAL AMENDMENTS: THE SECOND EDITION (2007), 
at 1 n.3, 2–3 (2007), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/2007Summaryof 
SedonaPrinciples2ndEditionAug17assentforWG1.pdf. 
 62. SEDONA, supra note 61, at 67. 
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proposals focused on the technical details of electronic data. For 
example, Sedona distinguished certain data types as presumptively 
discoverable or not, like “active data” (ordinary files) and backup or 
deleted “legacy data” accessible only at high cost.63 It also proposed 
certain best practices for e-discovery, most notably that “[d]iscovery 
requests for electronically stored information . . . be as clear as 
possible.”64 Zubulake I cited Sedona’s early work,65 and a subsequent 
report authored by a Sedona editor notes that courts have cited its 
earlier work, “helping provide de facto ‘national standards.’”66 Yet 
courts have not adopted Sedona wholesale; one topic Sedona 
addressed heavily, preservation of data, was “relegated . . . to 
evolving case law” because the e-discovery rules authors would not 
enact preservation standards.67 
Moreover, Zubulake I and Sedona, although thoughtful and 
useful guides to e-discovery, promise limited impact. They do not aim 
for a paradigm shift, instead relying on status-quo methods to limit 
discovery. Like Zubulake I, Sedona accepted as its touchstone the old 
“‘proportionality’ standard” of assessing costs “in light of the nature 
of the litigation and the amount in controversy.”68 Sedona rejected 
other ideas, like Texas’s mandatory cost shifting (making requesting 
parties pay for e-discovery not “reasonably available” in the 
“ordinary course” of business69) in favor of a merely permissive 
suggestion that cost “‘may’ (instead of ‘should’)” be shifted.70 
Zubulake I likewise said courts should order cost shifting only for 
“relatively inaccessible [data], such as in backup tapes” that are costly 
to recover,71 and “close calls should be resolved in favor of the 
 
 63. “Active data is typically stored on local hard drives, networked servers, and distributed 
devices or offline archival sources from which information can be accessed without a special 
restoration effort.” ALLMAN, supra note 61, at 6–7. “Information stored solely for disaster-
recovery purposes, ‘legacy’ data retained in obsolete systems, and deleted or fragmentary 
information that can be restored only through extraordinary efforts” ordinarily are “unduly 
burdensome and costly to access.” Id. at 5. 
 64. Id. at 25. 
 65. E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 n.61, 321 n.67 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 66. ALLMAN, supra note 61, at 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4. 
 70. ALLMAN, supra note 61, at 9. 
 71. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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presumption” against cost shifting,72 with cost shifting denied if 
evidence is sufficiently useful.73 
The 2006 Federal Rules amendments74 followed at least the spirit 
of Zubulake I and Sedona in stressing cost-benefit proportionality 
limits75: when digital or electronically stored information is “not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost . . . the court 
may nonetheless order discovery . . . if the requesting party shows 
good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C),”76 the 
proportionality rule. The Advisory Committee’s notes to these new 
rules built on Zubulake I and other case law by prescribing an 
essentially similar cost-benefit analysis instructing courts to look to 
various factors relevant to the likely benefit and cost of a disputed 
discovery request.77 
 
 72. Id. at 320. 
 73. See id. at 322 (noting factors such as the “extent to which the request is specifically 
tailored to discover relevant information . . . [and] [t]he relative benefits to the parties of 
obtaining the information”); see also AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444 
(2007) (“Defendant shall bear the costs of restoration of the initial sample of back-up tapes and 
screening the sample to identify responsive documents. The parties will then have an 
opportunity to argue . . . [whether] additional restoration of back-up tapes is likely to lead to 
production of relevant evidence and consequently who should bear the cost . . . .”). 
 74. Three rules primarily control e-discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring 
initial disclosures to give locations of documents and “electronically stored information” (ESI)); 
id. 34(a)(1)(A) (deeming ESI part of “document” demands and allowing ESI testing or 
sampling); id. 34(b) (allowing parties to “specify the form . . . in which electronically stored 
information is to be produced,” with default rule that ESI be produced as “ordinarily 
maintained” or in form “reasonably usable”); id. 45 (allowing ESI discovery from nonparties). 
 75. See Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 9–10 (comments of Lee H. Rosenthal, J., United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas) (explaining that it is “clear that the key 
is proportionality” in the new e-discovery rule, because its “good cause determination must be 
based on the proportionality limits that [already] have been in the rules”). 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 77. Id. 26 advisory committee’s note. According to the Advisory Committee, 
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the discovery request; 
(2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources; 
(3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is 
no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding 
relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily 
accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further 
information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the 
parties’ resources. 
Id. 
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B. The E-Discovery Rules: Just More Disappointingly Conventional 
and Ineffective Proportionality Limits 
With the 2006 e-discovery rules following earlier proposals by 
the Manual for Complex Litigation, Zubulake I and other district 
courts, the Sedona Group, and academic writings,78 the rules evolved 
in a highly decentralized fashion. Decentralization, though chaotic, 
often has the virtue of yielding a flourish of creative, varied 
independent efforts. Oddly, the major proposals to limit technology-
inspired discovery proliferation since the 1970s have been similar, 
even derivative, cost-benefit proportionality rules; at best, these 
proposals contain a mild, permissive suggestion of cost shifting in the 
rarest, most costly discovery situations.79 
But the main problem with proportionality limits on discovery is 
not that they are old news. Rather, the problem is that such limits 
never have worked terribly well and appear unlikely to work well for 
e-discovery. Although the idea of proportionality has gained 
momentum for decades, led by powerful forces in the judiciary and 
the bar, proportionality is widely criticized as having been ineffective 
at convincing judges to rein in discovery excess. “Whatever the 
theoretical possibilities,” the proportionality rule “created only a 
ripple in the caselaw,” a leading civil procedure treatise notes; “no 
radical shift has occurred.”80 
Even if the proportionality rule did not yield a major shift, courts 
do deny discovery for cost reasons. To be sure, some plaintiffs get 
very broad discovery; Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,81 for 
example, allowed discovery of all prior defective-product complaints 
over pleas that the discovery would require a costly search of 
voluminous records.82 The court explained that “most courts have 
 
 78. See, e.g., Horning, supra note 26, at 1344 (proposing that courts more often require 
production of digital rather than paper data, as well as that courts more often allow requesting 
parties to require that producing parties put that data into specific forms and facilitate 
interpretation of complex data); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation 
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 615–18 (2001) (proposing more cost shifting to parties requesting 
costly e-discovery); Pulver, supra note 13, at 1386 (same). 
 79. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 80. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 44, § 2008.1, at 121; see also Ronald J. Hedges, A View 
from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 127 (2005) (“[T]he proportionality principle of 
Rule 26(b)(2) . . . is not being utilized by judges . . . .”). 
 81. Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976). 
 82. Id. at 76–77. 
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held that the existence and nature of other complaints in product 
liability cases is a proper subject for pre-trial discovery,” and it would 
be unfair “[t]o allow a defendant whose business generates massive 
records to frustrate discovery by creating an inadequate filing system, 
and then claiming undue burden.”83 
But however persuasive Kozlowski’s logic, its permissiveness 
with costly discovery is the exception, not the rule. Courts often 
disallow discovery on relevant matters for reasons of cost, burden, 
and inconvenience, such as in decisions denying plaintiffs’ requests 
for discovery on similar instances of misconduct in claims of 
discrimination84 or other wrongdoing;85 courts similarly have rejected 
defendants’ efforts to discover information a government agency used 
to enact a disputed regulation.86 As to e-discovery in particular, the 
 
 83. Id. at 75–76. 
 84. See, e.g., Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 477–78 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding, in 
claims of racially discriminatory failure to promote and hostile work environment, a ruling that 
“discovery must be limited, in both its temporal and geographical reach,” to just complaints in 
plaintiff’s department for one year, and that plaintiff could not obtain discovery of complaints at 
all departments, despite the plaintiff’s argument that complaints “were contained in an easily 
accessible, central database, and he experienced discrimination at the hands of other [university] 
departments,” because the request was “unduly burdensome”); Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse 
Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 317, 319, 320 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding, in claim of 
“systematic elimination of older employees”, denial of discovery of statistical data, including 
records of all employees defendant terminated over nine years, because of courts’ “‘substantial 
discretion to curtail the expense and intrusiveness of discovery’ in limiting . . . broad discovery 
of personnel files” (quoting Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994))); EEOC v. 
D.C. Pub. Sch., 217 F.R.D. 12, 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying, in a claim of age discrimination in 
the termination of a teacher during a reduction in force, a request for “teaching disciplines of 
each teacher . . . [in the] academic year” when the plaintiff was terminated, when data was 
“perhaps retrievable [only] from a search of every personnel file,” which “would be 
oppressive”); Lee v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying 
a race discrimination plaintiff’s requests as to all employees “disciplined but not terminated 
for . . . time card infractions” (plaintiff’s alleged offense) over five years, when discovery “would 
require extensive searches of files outside of the locations” plaintiff worked); Aramburu v. 
Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434, 1442–44 (D. Kan. 1995) (denying a race and disability 
discrimination plaintiff discovery that would take 240 hours to procure 1,500 personnel files, 
because the “plaintiff’s need for the information” was “disproportionate” to the burden). 
 85. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Stewart, 220 F.R.D. 599, 602 (D. Ariz. 2004) (denying a motion to 
compel discovery in a prisoner’s claim of denial of court-ordered medical care because of the 
burden of “photocopying, organizing, and taking adequate measures to ensure prisoner 
confidentiality for the previous thirteen years of prisoner complaints”); Green Constr. Co. v. 
Kan. Power & Light Co., 732 F. Supp. 1550, 1554 (D. Kan. 1990) (denying a discovery request 
that would have required examining “nearly 62,400 bond claims” because the discovery’s 
relevance was outweighed by the burden of examining the bond claims, which lacked any 
“index[ing] or filing code system”). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 392, 393 (M.D.N.C. 2003) 
(denying the defendant, an energy company challenging an Environmental Protection Agency 
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limited case law has been mixed, but given the level of angst about 
costly e-discovery underlying these rules, they may be disappointing 
to their advocates. Whatever the mix of decisions allowing87 and 
disallowing88 costly e-discovery, however, a more fundamental 
problem remains with both the original proportionality rule and the 
e-discovery rules. 
Although denying relevant discovery due to cost may be 
defensible pragmatically, it is an unsatisfying concession that litigation 
accuracy inevitably is limited due to the cost of finding and analyzing 
evidence needed for accurate verdicts or settlements. Less accuracy is 
troubling not only morally but economically. Failing to impose 
liability on the guilty because evidence of guilt is too costly 
insufficiently deters misconduct and insufficiently assures that parties 
 
(EPA) air regulation, discovery from another federal agency whose “personnel may have been 
present when some decisions were made by the EPA,” because although “statements and 
positions taken by any EPA employee are relevant,” the “burden to the [plaintiff] far outweighs 
the relevance”); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 208 F.R.D. 449, 454 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying 
the plaintiff, in a suit against a federal agency for violating rules on issuing regulations, an order 
for nonparty witnesses to produce documents regarding those regulations, when the court saw 
the request as expensive and unduly burdensome). 
 87. Some cases allow costly e-discovery when justified by high case stakes. See, e.g., PSEG 
Power NY, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *1, *9–10 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (mem.) (ordering the plaintiff, in a $4.4 million construction contract 
claim, at cost the of $40,000 to $200,000, “to produce all electronically stored emails, numbering 
approximately 3000, conjunctively with their corresponding attachments as ‘married’ 
documents”). 
Other cases allow costly e-discovery despite modest case stakes when the information 
appears valuable. For example, in W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. 
Mass. 2007), regarding a claim that an employee benefit administrator breached its fiduciary 
duty, the court found that the data sought—thousands of employee claims stored electronically 
as unindexed images—were “not reasonably accessible,” id. at 43, when it could cost $80,000 
and 4,000 hours to recover 34,000 requested claim forms and medical bills, though plaintiff then 
narrowed its request to 3,000 claims, id. at 41, 44. Yet even though the discovery was 
burdensome and the “importance of the issues at stake” was low, the court allowed the 
discovery because the information was “clearly an integral part of the litigation . . . not only to 
BeneFirst’s culpability, but also to the amount of damages.” Id. at 44. 
 88. Courts also have denied, or denied unless plaintiffs paid the bulk of the cost, seemingly 
high-relevance e-discovery, see, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (requiring class action harassment plaintiffs to pay 75 percent of a $249,000 e-
mail search for known pornographic and other harassing e-mails), and have denied costly 
discovery even in high-stakes litigation in which the request seemed insufficiently essential, see, 
e.g., Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 247 F.R.D. 567, 569–72 (D. 
Minn. 2007) (denying, in a claim that landlords caused actual damages of $800,000, “enhanced 
damages” for fraud, and “long-term economic impact” on parties’ relationship, defendants’ 
request for plaintiff’s database on other landlords’ lease charges, because data was not in 
searchable format and required restoration, costing $124,000 plus $27,823 per month, and 
defendant could compile the data from paper discovery). 
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internalize costs (such as the costs of pollution) they impose on 
others.89 Conversely, imposing liability on the innocent because 
exculpatory evidence was too costly yields ill-targeted deterrence of 
innocent activity; imposing pollution liability on a nonpolluting 
business just disincentivizes that socially useful commerce.90 
Thus, proportionality rules can be criticized equally for allowing 
entirely opposite errors, both false negatives (failing to detect and 
halt discovery abuse) and false positives (finding disproportionate 
some costly discovery that actually is justified by high evidentiary 
value and case merit). Erroneous pro-plaintiff rulings unjustifiably 
increase litigation costs and pressure defendants to settle 
unmeritorious cases; conversely, erroneous pro-defendant rulings 
deny plaintiffs the ability to press meritorious claims successfully.91 
If the e-discovery rules are likely to yield the sort of uninspiring 
results seen after the original proportionality rule that so much of the 
legal establishment demanded, the question becomes how powerful 
forces attempting to respond to a hugely costly phenomenon have 
proven so impotent for so long? 
 
 89. As to the economic value of litigation accuracy, see generally Louis Kaplow, The Value 
of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 399 (1973). 
 90. Posner, supra note 89, at 402–06, 410–15. Although discovery is most commonly 
analyzed as a way plaintiffs get information from defendants, the opposite can be true as well. 
Defendants can destroy plaintiffs’ claims by pressing them for the details of, and facts 
supporting, their allegations; defendants also often press defenses that are based on the 
plaintiff’s conduct (and thus that require the defendant to seek discovery from the plaintiff), 
such as contributory negligence in tort cases, mitigation of damages in contract cases, and 
evidence of other misconduct that would have justified a challenged firing in employment 
discrimination cases. 
 91. Cf. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1287 (2002). As Professor Bone and Dr. Evans noted as to rulings on class 
action certification, 
Judges make mistakes. They grant certification when it should be denied, and they 
deny certification when it should be granted. . . . An erroneous grant creates 
unnecessary administrative and litigation costs and . . . unjustified settlements. An 
erroneous denial adds to plaintiffs’ litigation costs and can make it harder for 
plaintiffs to recover. 
Id. 
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II.  AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF WHY PROPORTIONALITY LIMITS, 
THOUGH POPULAR, CANNOT BE OPTIMAL 
A. The Consensus: Limit Discovery Based on Cost-Benefit 
Proportionality Principles 
For a field featuring so much controversy, discovery has featured 
an odd degree of consensus among analysts in disparate fields. 
Chicago School economists like Professor Richard Epstein, skeptical 
of whether much litigation is worth the potential for high cost and 
abuse, blame malleable balancing tests generally, including 
“underregulated” discovery, for the “inexorable expansion of [tort] 
liability.”92 Judge Frank Easterbrook, fretting about “impositional 
(excessive, abusive)” discovery that induces settlement by imposing 
high costs on defendants,93 advocates in part “limit[ing] discovery to 
matters admissible at trial”94—a drastic change from allowing any 
discovery “relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” including 
material that is inadmissible but “reasonably calculated to lead to . . . 
admissible evidence.”95 Surprisingly, many non–Chicago School 
economists have similar qualms about discovery. Professors Robert 
Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld propose that after a “reasonable” 
amount of discovery in a case, the cost of responding to discovery 
requests should shift to the requesting party.96 Though disagreeing 
with that proposal, Professor Bruce Hay notes how heavy discovery, 
by scaring defendants into settling early, can counterproductively lead 
to less, not more, disclosure of illegality.97 
There are dissenting voices criticizing the drive to narrow 
discovery, often with arguments that limiting discovery favors 
defendants over plaintiffs or that drives to limit discovery are 
 
 92. Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469, 476 (1987). 
 93. Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637, 644 
n.26 (1989); see also Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 782, 809 (1986) (criticizing the “ability of a well-heeled or determined plaintiff to hound 
a defendant in discovery”). 
 94. Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 644 n.26. 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 96. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 459 (1994); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New 
Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 69–76 (1995). For other cost-shifting proposals, see supra note 
78. 
 97. Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 
510–14 (1994). 
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premised on exaggerated fears of discovery abuse by plaintiffs.98 
Relatedly, there have been empirical findings that discovery excess 
may be confined to exceptional cases.99 But those voices have been on 
the periphery of the consensus in favor of more proportionality-based 
limits on discovery—a consensus spanning (as this Section discusses) 
civil proceduralists, economists, and the judges who have enacted rule 
changes imposing new discovery limits since the 1970s. 
Proportionality limits can be optimal, though, only if courts can 
perform the needed economic cost-benefit analyses passably well. 
What this Article seeks to add to the scholarship on the 
proportionality rule is that courts cannot undertake the needed 
analyses well—which means that discovery limits are doomed to be 
suboptimal. 
B. An Economic View of Discovery: Helping Factfinders Assess Case 
Value and Merit (L and p)—Which Makes Discovery 
Decisionmaking Circular 
The purpose of broad discovery, in economic terms, is well 
established: “[a] full exchange of the information . . . enabl[es] each 
party to form a more accurate, and generally therefore a more 
convergent, estimate of the likely [case] outcome.”100 The case law 
uses similar logic to justify broad discovery.101 This Article focuses not 
only on how discovery helps parties assess cases, but also on how 
judges decide discovery disputes—a matter more rarely analyzed in 
 
 98. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 
1396 (1994) [hereinafter Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray]; Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive 
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 685 (1998); Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery 
“Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 252 (Spring/Summer 2001) (arguing against 1990s-
era discovery rules amendments “constricting the availability of information and continuing the 
late twentieth-century evolution favoring defendants over plaintiffs”). 
 99. See Willging et al., supra note 4, at 547 n.34 (noting that discovery cost is unusually high 
in the costliest 5 percent of cases); see also Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 98, at 
1397, 1432–42 (reviewing a number of empirical studies and finding “a surprisingly low 
incidence of discovery in federal civil litigation”). 
 100. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 571 (6th ed. 2003); see also 
ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 203 (2003) 
(characterizing discovery similarly). 
 101. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”). 
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economic terms.102 Such judicial decisionmaking draws little academic 
attention, probably because almost all discovery decisions are 
unappealable district court decisions103 and because only experienced 
litigators recognize that if cases are won and lost in discovery, they 
really are won and lost in litigating discovery motions, dueling motions 
to compel discovery104 and for protective orders.105 
A court must undertake a cost-benefit analysis to decide, as the 
rules require, whether the value of particular discovery is 
proportional to its cost (both dollar cost and nonpecuniary burdens). 
It must assess the cost of finding and producing the evidence, and it 
must compare that cost to the benefit of having that evidence. 
Assessing cost often is feasible; parties litigating discovery regularly 
detail the time and dollar costs of producing disputed evidence.106 
Assessing the benefit of particular discovery is the tricky part. As 
this Section discusses, for truly accurate judicial decisionmaking, a 
court must consider not only the probative value of the particular 
evidence and the size of the case (as the rules command), but also—
contrary to the conventional wisdom on discovery decisionmaking—
the likelihood that the case is meritorious, that the plaintiff will 
prevail at trial. In economic terms, the court’s proportionality 
determination bases on the following three variables: 
• L, the size of the case, typically the amount in controversy but 
also possibly the value of nonmonetary relief; 
• p, the probability that the plaintiff will win if the case goes to 
trial; and 
• Δp, the probative value of the evidence (the difference the 
disputed evidence makes to p). 
Yet, as this Section discusses, each of these three variables can be 
difficult or impossible for courts to assess during discovery.  This 
difficulty is why this Article offers a diagnosis of pessimism about 
 
 102. For one article that does undertake just such an analysis of a range of procedural 
matters, including but not limited to discovery decisions, see Robert G. Bone, Who Decides?: A 
Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1996–2000 (2007). Bone 
analyzes procedural decisions based on a view of the judge as not an “umpire” but “a player in 
the game” whose decisions interact with those of the parties’ to affect the course of litigation. Id. 
 103. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). 
 105. See id. 26(c). 
 106. For a collection of cases in which parties detailed and argued before the court the costs 
and burdens of responding to discovery requests, see supra notes 84–88. 
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courts’ ability to make accurate proportionality decisions on 
discovery disputes. 
1. Size of Case (L): Difficult to Determine in Many Cases.  Under 
the proportionality rule, in assessing the likely benefit of discovery, 
courts should take into account “the amount in controversy . . . [and] 
importance of the issues at stake.”107 This makes economic sense; 
discovery offers less benefit in low-value cases. More evidence-
gathering expense is justified in a case that might result in millions of 
dollars changing hands; it is harder to justify similar evidence-
gathering expense in a small-claims dispute.108 
The “amount in controversy” (dollar value) and “importance of 
the issues” (nonmonetary value), however, can be uncertain until 
trial; plaintiffs often press claims that present a strong argument for 
some amount of damages (such as recovery of out-of-pocket losses) 
with a weaker claim for additional damages (such as punitive 
damages).109 Worse, case value can be subjective;110 what is the value 
of an injunction stopping seal clubbing, sexual harassment, or other 
illegality? Courts do assign damages awards for complex, 
nonpecuniary harms like torture.111 Still, it remains wholly subjective 
whether evidence that might help win an injunction stopping seal 
clubbing is proportional to a month-long, million-dollar data search. 
With case value often subjective, one problem with 
proportionality is “finding principled criteria for differentiating 
 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 108. One caveat: If there are many similar low-value claims, then discovery in any one such 
case might be quite valuable, even if the claims are not aggregated into a class action, so long as 
the information disclosure in one case yields benefits for the others similarly situated, either by 
reducing other litigants’ discovery costs or by disclosing illegality before it occurs (and thereby 
saving not only litigation cost, but also the cost of the illegality). 
 109. See Davis v. Ross, 107 F.R.D. 326, 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[P]lausible claims for 
punitive damages can easily be made in many actions . . . . [T]he amount of damages will always 
be in issue; plaintiff seeks one million dollars in compensatory damages, and evidence must be 
introduced to demonstrate that the award should be more than nominal.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 110. See, e.g., Lyons v. Mobil Oil Corp., 554 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Conn. 1982) (holding that 
the prevailing party wins attorneys’ fees unless it obtains only nominal damages because 
“[i]njunctive relief is an important part of the [statutory] scheme . . . regardless of whether . . . 
damages are awarded”); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 912 (1999) (“Assigning 
values to substantive interests is both difficult and controversial. Reasonable people disagree, 
for example, about the relative importance of the different interests protected by the 
Constitution.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (awarding damages in a 
human rights class action). 
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between various types of cases”; “[w]here . . . are judges expected to 
find the criteria and analytical structure for making such judgments” 
as whether more discovery is warranted on a high-dollar contract 
claim than on a low-dollar discrimination claim for mainly injunctive 
relief?112 These problems can be mitigated with rules of thumb as to 
“the amount of discovery normally permissible in certain types of 
cases”113: 
[A] search for discriminatory intent in a civil rights case may be seen 
as involving constitutional values . . . [and] broader discovery . . . 
than in a personal injury or commercial case. On the other hand, 
judicial experience indicating that in certain civil rights cases . . . 
further discovery is unlikely to shed additional light . . . might lead a 
judge to place limits . . . .114 
Although “patterns of appropriate discovery . . . may emerge 
which can normally be followed unless the particular facts warrant 
otherwise,”115 “[o]bviously these judgments will not be easy.”116 Nor 
will they be optimal; even the best rule of thumb treats cases similarly 
despite relevant differences between them.117 
This difficulty estimating L is not the main topic of this Article’s 
analysis, but the partial solution, assuming the same average value for 
all cases in the same pool, returns in this Section as a similar 
imperfect solution to the problem of estimating p, the probability that 
the plaintiff would win at trial. 
 
 112. Edward F. Sherman & Stephen O. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80’s—
Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 276 (1982). 
 113. Id. at 279. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. I should not overstate the point; the relevant rules of thumb could be made as accurate 
as possible by refining them for various subsets of cases. Cf. Bone, supra note 102, at 1996 
(noting, as to various procedural matters for which judges might lack the information necessary 
for accurate rulings, that “it is possible to find criteria, such as type of claim, amount in 
controversy, number of parties, and so on, to sort different case types with reasonable clarity 
and efficiency”). For example, rather than just say that employment discrimination cases are 
fact intensive and thus warrant more discovery, the relevant rule of thumb could allow more 
discovery in certain kinds of discrimination cases, such as incumbent employees’ termination 
and promotion claims (which typically depend on detailed evaluations of years of employee 
performance), but not rejected applicants’ claims (in which all the employer knew was the 
applicant’s interview and paper application, not years of performance). Still, even the best rule 
of thumb is just the best probabilistic generalization, one that yields suboptimal results in 
nonconforming cases. 
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2. Probative Value of the Evidence Sought (Δp): Difficult to 
Assess before Fully Analyzing That and Other Evidence.  The most 
important consideration in a discovery dispute is the probative value 
of the evidence—Δp, the difference (Δ) the evidence makes to the 
probability (p) the plaintiff will win at trial. The proportionality rule 
asks courts to assess the likely benefit of discovery, taking into 
account “the needs of the case . . . and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues,” which are aspects of probative 
value.118 Complexity of the issues,119 another proportionality factor, 
also goes to probative value: in a simple case (that is, “did the 
defendant sign the contract?”), more evidence has little probative 
value. Rather, more evidence is most useful in cases about technical 
matters,120 hidden intent,121 and so forth. 
Yet courts may have difficulty discerning the probative value of 
evidence before discovery of that evidence. Nobody knows in 
advance what a witness will say in a deposition, making it difficult to 
assess the probative value of going beyond the ten-deposition limit.122 
The same holds for searching computers or voluminous paper files: 
the party opposing discovery will have to make its proportionality 
cost-benefit argument before the search, so the court will not see the 
fruits of the discovery before having to rule on discovery’s likely 
benefit.123 
“In the absence of any information about [the] evidence,” Judge 
Richard Posner noted in discussing how parties anticipate opposing 
evidence, the only option is to “assume that such evidence . . . is of 
average helpfulness.”124 For example, when a court must decide 
whether a data search for similar stock trades is worth the cost, all it 
 
 118. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 119. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 120. The rules and cases on expert witness admissibility expressly rely on this logic. See, e.g., 
Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989) (“For an expert’s 
testimony to be admissible . . . , it must be directed to . . . scientific, technical, or specialized 
knowledge and not to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without 
the expert’s help.”). 
 121. Employment discrimination cases are the paradigmatic example. See sources cited 
supra note 1. 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (requiring “leave of court” for more than ten depositions); 
id. 30(d)(1) (providing that “a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours” absent leave of court). 
 123. See BONE, supra note 100, at 229 n.36 (noting that to expand discovery past 
presumptive limits, courts must assess the value of greater discovery, which “is bound to be 
difficult in the absence of precise knowledge of what the discovery will reveal”). 
 124. POSNER, supra note 100, at 571. 
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knows is whether these kinds of searches, in these kinds of cases, are 
usually fruitful for plaintiffs (or defendants).125 As when assessing the 
size (L) of cases with subjective value, courts assessing probative 
value have little other than Professors Sherman and Kinnard’s idea 
that “patterns of appropriate discovery in certain cases may emerge” 
based on “rules-of-thumb for determining the amount of discovery 
normally permissible in certain [case] types.”126 These rules about 
particular case types, however, can be fairly indeterminate.  In some 
“civil rights cases,” for example, “further discovery is unlikely to shed 
additional light on the issues”127; on the other hand, perhaps such 
cases’ complex intent questions require more extensive evidence 
gathering.128 The tension between these competing views of discovery 
in civil rights cases shows how imperfect such rules of thumb can be, 
even if they are the best among the imperfect alternatives available to 
judges. 
Thus, even the most relevant proportionality factor—probative 
value—can be difficult for courts to analyze, especially if they cannot 
see the evidence before ruling (such as in determining whether 
upcoming deposition testimony will include enough useful content). 
As this Section moves on to discuss, it is just as hard for courts to 
analyze p, the variable capturing the merit of the case (the probability 
that the plaintiff would win at trial), and, disturbingly, most courts do 
not even see merit as relevant to discovery decisions. 
3. Probability the Claim Has Merit (p): Difficult for Court to 
Assess before Seeing All the Evidence and the Parties’ Arguments 
about That Evidence. 
a. Why Courts Do Not Consider Case Merit in Making Discovery 
Decisions: The Conventional Wisdom that Discovery is Unrelated to 
Case Merit.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created, and 
initially interpreted, on a consensus view, in the words of a famous 
 
 125. The plaintiff, the party with the burden of proving its opponent’s misconduct, usually is 
the one seeking more discovery. Defendants may seek extensive discovery to prove misdeeds by 
plaintiffs, see sources cited supra note 90; such a defendant is in a position akin to that of a 
plaintiff, seeking evidence to prove its opponent’s misdeeds, which is why this Article takes as 
its paradigmatic example plaintiffs seeking evidence to prove allegations of misconduct that 
defendants deny. 
 126. Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 112, at 279. 
 127. Id. 
 128. One example of a case that presents a complex intent question is Hollander v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990). See supra note 1. 
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article by Professor Robert Cover, that “the procedure available in 
our courts of general jurisdiction,” including the federal courts, “is 
assumed to be largely invariant with substance.”129 That view of 
litigation procedure has drawn increasing criticism,130 beginning with 
Professor Cover, and some of the Federal Rules do mandate inquiries 
into the merits, though primarily rules governing substantive (rather 
than purely procedural) pretrial rulings on the merits, such as motions 
for dismissal,131 for summary judgment,132 or for preliminary 
injunctions.133 But for discovery in particular, it remains received 
wisdom that proportionality rulings do not depend on the case merits 
(p, the odds the plaintiff would win at trial); rather, the factors 
entering into proportionality rulings include case size (L, amount in 
controversy and importance of issues) and issue complexity (Δp, 
probative value).134 The proportionality rule and its Advisory 
Committee’s note detail various factors for assessing the likely benefit 
of requested discovery, none of which relates to case merits; all the 
factors relate to case size, probative value, the parties’ resources, and 
whether the evidence is available elsewhere.135 
Courts rarely say anything about case merits in deciding 
discovery disputes. When courts do discuss case merits in adjudicating 
 
 129. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 
84 YALE L.J. 718, 732 (1975) (recounting in depth, and criticizing, that prevailing view); see also 
Bone, supra note 110, at 894–95 (recounting the prevailing view underlying enactment of the 
Federal Rules that “procedure was normatively distinct from and subordinate to substantive 
law. . . . [so that] the design of a procedural system was mainly a technical exercise in perfecting 
administrative machinery . . . enforc[ing] the substantive law (whatever that law might be) . . . . 
[because] the values relevant to procedural rulemaking were not substantive in nature”). 
 130. See, e.g., Bone & Evans, supra note 91, at 1282–83 (“Insofar as the argument assumes 
that it is possible to mark a sharp divide between procedure and substance, it ignores decades of 
judicial frustration grappling with the procedure/substance dichotomy.”); Cover, supra note 129, 
at 732–33 (“It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural needs of a complex 
antitrust action . . . and an environmental class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are 
sufficiently identical to be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which makes virtually no 
distinctions among such cases in terms of available process.”). 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (providing for review of merits at the pleading stage). 
 132. Id. 56 (providing for review of merits at the pretrial stage). 
 133. Id. 65 (providing that “likelihood of success” on the merits is a factor in judges’ 
decisions whether to grant motions for preliminary injunctions). 
 134. As to L, see supra Part II.B.1. As to p, see supra Part II.B.2. 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (assessing “likely benefit” by “the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 
and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues”); id. advisory committee’s 
note (listing similar factors and noting that “cases in public policy spheres, such as employment 
practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary 
amount”). 
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discovery disputes, it almost always is to disclaim any consideration of 
the merits, as in this classic passage from a case decided soon after the 
1938 enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
[D]efendant is really arguing . . . that the issue raised by the plaintiff 
is irrelevant, not that the interrogatories are irrelevant to the 
issue. . . . Whether or not the plaintiff is right is immaterial at this 
stage. . . . [T]o ask the Court to decide the whole case on answers to 
interrogatories involves a misconception of the office of discovery 
procedure.136  
There are rare exceptions to the rule that courts do not consider 
case merit in discovery decisions, but they typically occur in two 
circumstances. First, Congress may mandate a sequencing of 
discovery and a merits inquiry, most notably as it did in the Private 
 
 136. Love v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 8 F.R.D. 583, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1948); see also Carrizosa v. 
Stassinos, No. C 05-2280 RMW (RS), 2006 WL 1581953, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006) 
(“[P]ropriety of discovery does not turn on one party’s belief that the claims are without 
merit. . . . This [discovery] motion . . . does not turn on the merits . . . but on the relevance of the 
materials requested to such claims.”); Maher v. Monahan, No. 98 Civ. 2319 (JGK)(MHD), 2000 
WL 777877, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2000) (“We need not . . . address the ultimate merits of 
plaintiff’s claim in order to assess the immediate discovery dispute.”); Natural Res. Def. Council 
v. Curtis, 189 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[P]ermitting discovery and leaving [aside] the 
question of the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ case as a matter of law . . . is the way . . . courts handle 
such matters. . . . [Plaintiffs] are not required to establish a legally sufficient case . . . as a 
condition of securing discovery . . . .”); United States v. Clean Harbors, No. C-89-109-L, 1995 
WL 155007, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 21, 1995) (“[T]he motion . . . deals solely with parameters of 
discovery and does not touch or address the merits of the case.”); In re Gupta Sec. Litig., No. 94-
1517 FMS (FSL), 1994 WL 675209, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1994) (“In considering whether to 
stay discovery pending . . . a motion to dismiss, a court should not weigh the relative merits.”); 
In re First Constitution S’holder Litig., 145 F.R.D. 291, 294 (D. Conn. 1991) (deeming case 
merits irrelevant to a decision to stay discovery pending dismissal motion and stating that “[t]his 
judicial officer has a great uneasiness in reviewing . . . [the] complaint and the pending motion to 
dismiss and in second-guessing which one is likely to be the more meritorious”); Chubb 
Integrated Sys. v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 59 (D.D.C. 1984) (“[O]n questions of 
discovery, typically, courts do not determine the legal sufficiency of claims.”); Paramount Film 
Distrib. Corp. v. Ram, 15 F.R.D. 404, 405 (E.D.S.C. 1954) (“Plaintiffs’ objections to the 
remaining interrogatories are based upon their contention that the allegations by the 
defendants . . . do not constitute a valid defense . . . . but so far as [the court is] aware no motion 
has been made by the plaintiffs to strike this defense of the defendants. [The court] know[s] of 
no authority that [it] ha[s] to strike such a defense [on its] own motion. The defense, therefore, 
until stricken is valid. [The court] cannot say that the interrogatories are not relevant . . . .”); 
V.D. Anderson Co. v. Helena Cotton Oil Co., 117 F. Supp. 932, 945 n.9 (E.D. Ark. 1953) (“[I]t 
is no objection to an interrogatory that it relates to a defense or claim which is insufficient in 
law. It is not ordinarily the function of the court in passing upon objections to interrogatories to 
decide ultimate questions.”); Laird v. United Shipyards, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 772, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 
(“The validity of defenses need not be determined upon a motion to limit an examination 
before trial, where the matter sought to be inquired into is relevant . . . .”). 
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Securities Litigation Reform Act requirement of staying discovery137 
pending dismissal motions under a heightened pleading standard138—
but such a congressional mandate is rare. Second, courts sometimes 
analyze whether disputed discovery implicates such a weighty public 
interest that it must be disallowed absent a sufficient showing of 
merit139—but this rare exception shows not that courts do consider 
case merits on discovery motions, but instead that a strong public 
interest can create a sort of privilege against disclosure that only 
sufficient case merit can overcome. Sporadic exceptions that prove 
the rule aside, the rule against considering case merit on discovery 
motions is quite well established and consistently followed. 
b. Why Courts Should Consider Case Merit: Optimal Discovery 
Depends on Whether a Case is a Close Call.  Whether or not the 
conventional wisdom is an accurate statement of how courts actually 
decide discovery disputes, it is dead wrong as to how courts should 
decide them. Accurate cost-benefit analysis of the value of evidence is 
impossible without considering case merits, because the benefit of 
evidence (helping a plaintiff140 prove a case) is highest when the 
plaintiff’s claim has enough merit that the factfinder is permitted, but 
not compelled, to rule for the plaintiff. In the lowest-odds cases, 
additional evidence has little value because it is unlikely to affect the 
outcome, which is why parties can move to dismiss before discovery—
to avoid discovery when, given the lack of merit, “[n]o amount of 
discovery could change the legal reality [of] plaintiff’s claim.”141 
 
 137. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 
109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006)) (“In any private 
action arising under this chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the 
pendency of any motion to dismiss . . . .”). 
 138. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4b(1) (requiring that plaintiffs identify each false or misleading 
statement and specify why each was false or misleading). 
 139. Discovery decisions considering case merits tend to feature a high public interest that 
discovery would jeopardize, such as a public interest in newsgathering harmed by discovery 
from journalists, see, e.g., Apel v. Murphy, 70 F.R.D. 651, 654 (D.R.I. 1976), or in avoiding 
publicity that would discourage reports of air accidents, see, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219 (D. Del. 1960). 
 140. For a discussion of how the same analysis applies to defendants, see supra note 125. 
 141. Federico v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 378, 386 (2006) (dismissing the case before 
discovery for failure to state a claim because of the “legal reality. . . that federal employees who 
serve by appointment may not bring contract claims”); see also, e.g., Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 
444 F.3d 312, 324 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding the same, on a claim that the defendant “deprived 
consumers of competitive technology” when the claim of injury from deterred invention of new 
technology was “speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial proceeding,” so that 
“discovery would not change or inform the nature of the alleged injuries”). 
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Conversely, although it is the rare case that is so facially clear-cut that 
it requires no discovery at all (although there are such cases, such as a 
clear breach of a contract to pay a certain sum142), the highest-odds 
cases more quickly reach the point in discovery after which additional 
evidence will be of little use.143 
Thus, the optimal amount of discovery depends on the odds that 
a claim will win: the closer the case is to having fifty-fifty odds, the 
more the jury needs additional evidence to help it decide the case, so 
more discovery should be allowed. The remainder of this Section 
offers some fairly brief economic modeling of this analysis; readers 
disinclined to mathematical or economic models can skip those 
portions of this Article without any problem, but the economic 
models are offered to show how traditional economic cost-benefit 
models of litigation could be improved by incorporating the points 
this Article adds.144 
Case merit (p) affects the optimal discovery amount because of 
the court’s opposing goals: (1) limit discovery cost (CD) and (2) limit 
the error cost (CE) of incorrect verdicts. More discovery raises 
discovery cost (CD) while lowering error cost (CE). The latter has a 
diminishing marginal benefit; each additional piece of evidence likely 
is less useful (less helpful at preventing error) than the prior one (for 
example, the first deposition is the defendant company’s key 
decisionmaker, the second is a key witness, the third is a peripheral 
witness).145 The court must choose the discovery amount (Q, quantity) 
 
 142. See, e.g., New Rochelle Dodge, Inc. v. Bank of N.Y., 511 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (App. Div. 
1987) (granting the plaintiff prediscovery “summary judgment in lieu of complaint” when the 
defendant “acknowledged the debt” on retail installment contract); Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A. v. Marcovitz, 392 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (App. Div. 1977) (holding the same for debt to a law 
firm). 
 143. This point should not be overstated because a high-odds case quickly can become a 
low-odds case if denied sufficient discovery. The only (modest) point here about evidentiary 
value in close-call cases versus higher-odds cases is just that although both case types typically 
need discovery, the point at which additional evidence proves redundant is likely to come earlier 
in the high-odds case. 
 144. See BONE, supra note 100, at 89 n.63 (noting similarly that readers “whose algebra is a 
bit rusty can skip . . . [these] algebraic expressions without any problem”). 
 145. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1482 (1999) (“[As] more evidence is obtained, the effect of additional evidence . . . 
will tend to decrease, especially if the search[] begins . . . with the most probative evidence.”). A 
related reason evidence offers diminishing marginal benefits is that “[i]f the searcher cannot 
determine in advance which evidence is . . . fruitful, his search procedure will resemble random 
sampling, and as the size of a sample grows, the value of additional sampling . . . [is] at a falling 
rate.” Id. at 1482–83. 
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that minimizes total cost, which is the sum of discovery and error cost 
(C = CD + CE). The court’s decision is illustrated by the following 
relatively informal model, which is based on the classic incomplete 
information Cournot duopoly model.146 
Goal: 
Q
min  C = CD + CE. Explanation: 
• Choose the amount of discovery (Q) that minimizes the sum of 
error costs and discovery costs. 
Where: CD = aQ. Explanation: 
• Discovery’s cost (CD) is proportional to its amount (Q) times a 
constant (a) reflecting cost per unit discovery. 
And where: CE = (
b/Q)(p - p
2). Explanation: 
• The term p-p2 models error risk as highest for close calls (p = 0.5), 
lowest when merit is clear (p=0 or p=1). 
• Error cost (CE) drops at a declining rate as discovery increases (Q), 
as modeled by term b/Q (the constant b reflects evidentiary value 
per unit discovery). 
Substituting the above expressions for CD and CE into 
Q
min C = CD + 
CE yields 
Q
min C = 
Q
min aQ + (b/Q)(p-p
2). 
Optimization conditions: choose Q*, the optimal discovery amount, 
to minimize C (more discovery would increase cost more than it 










∂  > 0 









C ==∂∂  
a
b)(  *Q 2pp −= . Explanation: Optimal discovery (Q*) depends 
on p. 
Calculating the term constituting condition (2): 
 
 146. In a Cournot model, two firms comprise a market; facing an inverse demand curve, 
each chooses production quantity based on the probability the other has high costs (low output) 
or low costs (high output). ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 144 
(1992). My model is analogous as to the probability a case has merit. With optimal discovery 
rising, and then falling as p increases, I model p as a continuous, not discrete, variable (and thus 
use derivatives for optimization calculations). See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & 
ECONOMICS 317 (4th ed. 2003) (noting preference for “develop[ing] theory using continuous 
variables”). 
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∂  = 2b(p-p2)/Q3 > 0.  
Explanation: The condition is satisfied because all components of 
the term are positive: b and Q are inherently positive, and (p-p2)>0 
for all p from 0 to 1. 
In sum, the optimal discovery amount (Q*)147 depends on the odds a 
claim will win (p). Optimal discovery is highest when the odds are 
close to fifty-fifty (the closer p is to 0.5) and lowest when merit level is 
more apparent (the closer p is to 0 or 1). 
 c. Why Courts Cannot Easily Consider Case Merit: In Discovery, 
Cases Are in a “Pooling Equilibrium” in which Parties Cannot Signal, 
and Courts Cannot Assess, Case Merit Effectively.  For courts to make 
accurate decisions as to optimal discovery amounts, they must 
consider p, case merit—yet that may be the hardest task in a 
discovery dispute. This is a problem of decisionmaker difficulty 
interpreting information signals (parties’ claims as to case merit), so it 
is useful to model the situation with game theory, the branch of 
economics that is a “powerful tool for modeling information and 
studying its economic role.”148 In game theory terms, a decision (here, 
court discovery rulings) must base on some measure of merit (often in 
game theory the value of a good for sale, but here the merits of 
parties’ claims) that parties try to communicate. But during discovery, 
it is hard for courts to tell which cases truly have merit because all the 
evidence has not yet been gathered. Even if all the evidence had been 
gathered, courts cannot review all of a case’s evidence (essentially 
holding a minitrial) just to resolve a discovery dispute. As a result, in 
discovery, those of low merit often can falsely signal high merit.149 
With limited potential for effectively communicating merit, the 
court’s decision must base on the average merit of all cases in the 
pool, such as the pool of all cases arising under the same statute that 
 
 147. To reiterate the preceding calculations: )2(
a
b
  *Q pp −= . 
 148. H. SCOTT BIERMAN & LUIS FERNANDEZ, GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC 
APPLICATIONS § 17.1, at 297 (1993); see also Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1990) (“[T]he theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic 
theory.”). 
 149. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME 
THEORY § 11.1, at 320 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that “signaling costs must differ” between those of 
high and low worth “for signaling to be useful”). 
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are neither facially frivolous nor obvious winners.150 Premising 
discovery rulings on such broad, blunt proxies as case type is destined 
to yield inaccuracy in many individual cases, but this imperfect 
“pooling equilibrium,”151 or ruling the same regardless of case merit, 
remains courts’ best available strategy.152 Others have noted how 
parties discount each others’ bragging about the merits of their case 
or about a certain piece of evidence.153 This Article adds that not only 
parties, but also courts deciding discovery disputes, face the same 
dilemma of receiving useless signals of merit. 
Worse, judges might have an exaggerated (rather than accurate) 
perception of the extent to which, in discovery, they must assume all 
 
 150. Courts occasionally admit premising their rulings on broad hunches, of questionable 
accuracy in any individual case, about case merit based on proxies such as case type. See, e.g., In 
re First Constitution S’holder Litig., 145 F.R.D. 291, 293 (D. Conn. 1991) (“Securities fraud 
actions are recognized as being particularly vulnerable to strike suits . . . . [T]his action belongs 
to a class that is subject to strike suits . . . .”). Most courts, however, deny considering case merit 
in discovery decisions. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Courts also might see in the 
pleadings an apparent flaw that justifies limiting discovery until a dismissal motion. See, e.g., 
Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 644 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding limited discovery 
pending a dismissal motion, given that the complaint seemed highly questionable and a qualified 
immunity defense seemed promising). 
 151. BIERMAN & FERNANDEZ, supra note 148, § 18.2.6, at 337 (“[A] pooling equilibrium 
implies the informed player’s actions reveal nothing about what type of player he is.”). The 
situation actually is likely a partially pooling equilibrium because some parties can signal merit 
effectively, such as with a powerful piece of evidence unearthed early enough to submit to the 
court on a discovery motion. See GIBBONS, supra note 146, at 213–18 (discussing partially 
pooling equilibria). The pooling diagnosis remains because in many cases the evidence will be 
equivocal or disputed, and the court will have trouble sifting through both sides’ opposing 
arguments as to case merit, so many cases of varied merit levels will populate the same pool 
because they will feature signals (merits arguments) the court cannot distinguish without 
undertaking more effort than it typically can devote to a discovery dispute. 
 152. Alternatively, the situation could be viewed not as a pooling equilibrium in a signaling 
game (in which the party making the showing is informed but the party that must respond is 
not) but as a screening game (in which the party responding to the showing knows more than 
the party making that showing). See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 
Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases, 5 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 134, 140–42 (2003). This Article’s focus on diagnosing and remedying the signaling 
problems that afflict many cases (that in many cases, parties know more than the judge which 
claims or defenses have merit) should not be seen as an argument that all cases have signaling 
problems. There presumably are cases of close to complete, or at least symmetrically 
incomplete, information. Further, not all asymmetric-information cases are best described as 
signaling rather than as screening games; presumably there are cases in which the judge must 
screen claims and defenses because the judge knows better than the litigants which claims or 
defenses have merit—such as cases turning on complex disputed legal interpretations in which 
the judge knows best what the judge’s views will be on certain arguments. 
 153. BONE, supra note 100, at 205 (noting that because “parties have incentives to 
misrepresent that they have favorable evidence when they do not . . . [and] verification is not 
always possible . . . [recipients] discount the truth of the information disclosed”). 
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cases are low-merit ones not warranting costly discovery. If the pool 
contains more low- than high-merit cases, it is rational for judges to 
presume, early in a case, that the case likely has low merit and so does 
not deserve costly discovery. Presumably judges change such opinions 
as more case information emerges. But as anyone who has argued 
politics knows, relevant information may not convince people to 
change their initial opinions due to common cognitive biases, such as 
the confirmation bias154 (people’s tendency to be “not equally open to 
all information, but more open to that which comfortably confirms 
their views, more inclined to spin disconfirming evidence to fit”155) 
and the availability bias (the tendency to assume that easy-to-recall 
events are more likely than they really are156). Thus, judges’ early-
stage inability to distinguish good and bad cases may persist even 
after they have enough information about a case to separate it from 
the pool: “a judge might more easily recall cases where discovery was 
abused, leading her to assign an excessively high probability of abuse 
in the case before her and therefore choose stricter discovery limits 
than the case warrants.”157 Even if judges, experts at evidence analysis 
and logical conclusions, are less prone to such biases, there is little 
reason to think them immune from these well-documented quirks in 
human cognition, especially in light of experimental evidence that 
judges make decisions with intuitive shortcuts prone to exactly these 
biases.158 
Although ruling the same on all cases in the pool is the best 
available judicial strategy, it is merely the best among imperfect 
 
 154. P.C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129, 138–39 (1960) (finding that after people make an initial, 
premature guess as to a numerical pattern, they skew their interpretation of later data to 
preserve that guess). 
 155. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public Funding for Disability 
Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the 
ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 208 (1998) (noting the role of confirmation bias in 
perpetuating discriminatory stereotypes). 
 156. See, e.g., DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 119–20 (3d ed. 1990); see also Moss 
& Malin, supra note 155, at 207 (noting the role of availability bias in perpetuating 
discriminatory stereotypes). 
 157. Bone, supra note 102, at 1988. 
 158. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (2007). 
[In] our experimental research on judges[,] [w]e provide tests of judges’ general 
reasoning skills as well as their decision-making skills in legal contexts. Our results 
demonstrate that judges, like others, commonly make judgments intuitively, rather 
than reflectively, both generally and in legal contexts. 
Id. at 6. 
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strategies. In fact, it is an imperfect strategy that yields suboptimal 
results. In low-merit cases, ruling identically on all cases yields more 
discovery than justified by the need for more evidence to assess case 
merit. Ruling identically on all cases yields too little discovery in 
close-call cases; it disallows the extensive discovery that is justified 
when the case is a close call for the factfinder. In this scenario, the 
bad cases are treated too well and the good treated too badly, as in 
Professor George Akerlof’s classic economic analysis of used car 
markets: due to “asymmetry in available information . . . good cars 
and bad cars must still sell at the same price—since it is impossible for 
a buyer to tell the difference”; as a result, “bad cars drive out the 
good because they sell at the same price as good cars.”159 
As with product decisions, in litigation the bad may come to 
drive out the good. If courts allow most cases similar discovery—the 
amount appropriate for an average case—bad (weak) cases will take 
up too much time and money, whereas good cases lose for inability to 
gather enough evidence or may never be filed because they will be 
allowed only average-case discovery. The harder it is to dismiss bad 
cases quickly or reliably, (a) the more often those bad cases will settle 
for a nontrivial amount or (less often) yield a plaintiff’s verdict, and 
(b) the more judicial attention those bad cases will take up, at the 
expense of the attention the good cases deserve. This is to say that 
bad cases will drive out good cases; court dockets and parties’ 
litigation efforts may be filled with more bad cases and fewer good 
cases than they otherwise would have, absent this information 
problem in discovery. Consequently, the discovery problem this 
Article diagnoses—courts’ inability to separate good and bad cases 
until after the discovery that accounts for so much litigation cost—
may be a cause of the widely noted prevalence of frivolous 
litigation.160 
Could courts adjudicating discovery disputes undertake the 
necessary inquiries into the merits? Problematically, any merits 
analysis will be incomplete; it would lack at least some of the evidence 
because the analysis would be occurring during discovery and before 
the resolution of all discovery disputes. Moreover, even if all the 
evidence is in, the information costs of undertaking a merits analysis 
 
 159. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). 
 160. For views on litigation and discovery excess, see supra notes 81–91 and accompanying 
text. 
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to decide a discovery dispute is prohibitive; the court and the parties 
would have to spend a great deal of time, and the parties a great deal 
of money, holding a minitrial presenting and arguing about all the 
evidence and any allowable inferences. Thus, a merits analysis is 
necessary, but infeasible, for optimally accurate rulings on discovery 
disputes. 
Under this analysis, the quest for better discovery limits has 
disappointed not due to bad decisionmaking or bad rulemaking, as 
many argue.161 Typifying arguments blaming rulemaking, Professor 
Thomas Rowe criticizes as too “vague” to “curb[] cost and excess”162 
the narrowing of discovery, in the 2000 amendments to Rule 26, from 
material relevant to the “subject matter” to material relevant to 
“claims and defenses.”163 One judge less charitably depicted “debating 
[that] difference . . . [as] the juridical equivalent to debating the 
number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.”164 Professor 
Henry Noyes likewise faults bad rulemaking and bad judging: 
[The] e-discovery amendments are the fourth recent attempt to 
contain discovery. The three prior . . . relied on increased judicial 
discretion, mistakenly assuming that judges would act to limit 
discovery. . . . [H]owever, courts have continued to rely on the 
default policy of “liberal discovery.” . . . [T]he good cause standard 
is problematic both for the new e-discovery rules and for the existing 
discovery rules.165 
Professor Noyes concludes that “[t]he courts’ persistent reliance 
on the ‘liberal rules of discovery’ mantra will only be overcome with 
express instruction to limit discovery, which is absent from the e-
discovery amendments.”166 
 
 161. See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 
21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 71 (2007) (criticizing proportionality and e-discovery rules as too 
vague to rein in excess discovery that courts are too unwilling to limit); Redish, supra note 78, at 
563–64 (noting that “the rules’ drafters and revisers over the years . . . have failed to fashion a 
discovery process that satisfies most people,” and specifically criticizing discovery rules for 
lacking more cost shifting or spoliation provisions); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a 
Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 
14 (2001) (criticizing federal rules’ discovery limits as vague and therefore unable to change 
judicial decisionmaking). 
 162. Rowe, supra note 161, at 14. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Thompson v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md. 2001). 
 165. Noyes, supra note 161, at 51–52. 
 166. Id. at 52. 
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This Article, while agreeing that courts’ discovery 
decisionmaking is suboptimal, and perhaps not disagreeing that 
different rules could help, disagrees as to whether better rules or 
better judicial decisionmaking truly could fix the problem. The 
relevance to optimal discovery (as this Section discusses) of case 
merit, amount in controversy, and evidentiary probative value means 
that some sort of “proportionality” inquiry is inevitable; one cannot 
evade the relevance of the proportionality considerations. Yet even 
with the best of all possible rules and judging, courts and parties 
would remain stuck in a pooling equilibrium; judges simply do not 
have the necessary information to make optimal decisions about 
exactly what discovery to allow. It is a fundamental information 
timing problem inherent in the discovery stage of litigation: optimal 
discovery depends on the merits, but the merits are knowable only 
after discovery. As in the folk song about the hole in the bucket 
fixable only with a machine requiring water poured from that 
bucket,167 the problem is a classic circularity; the problem prevents the 
solution. 
III.  SOLVING THE POOLING THAT PREVENTS BETTER DISCOVERY 
DECISIONS: IN CLOSE CALLS ABOUT COSTLY DISCOVERY, 
PRESERVE THE EVIDENCE BUT DELAY THE DISCOVERY UNTIL 
AFTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Replacing the Pooling Equilibrium with a Separating Equilibrium 
as a Case Progresses 
In a pooling equilibrium, decisions are suboptimal because it is 
hard to distinguish between the meritorious and the unmeritorious, as 
discussed above. More optimal decisions are possible in a separating 
equilibrium in which parties are forced to “reveal their types to the 
previously uninformed” decisionmakers.168 Courts could make more 
accurate discovery decisions if they could better tell case merit, 
allowing more discovery in close-call cases that, being neither clear 
 
 167. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 168. Ayres, supra note 148, at 1307. Separating equilibria actually may be suboptimal if the 
signals have no intrinsic value except as signals of merit (for example, obtaining a certain 
educational degree as a signal of work ethic or intellect). In such a separating equilibrium, the 
cost of signal acquisition (for example, time and tuition) could exceed the improved ability to 
separate those of high and low merit. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 
355, 364–65 (1973). But this Article addresses forced disclosure of evidence a party wishes to 
conceal, so the problem of wasteful acquisition of signals is inapposite. 
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winners nor clear losers, warrant more extensive evidence gathering. 
But courts cannot separate the close calls from the broader case pool 
unless parties can credibly signal merit by citing and asserting the 
evidence supporting their positions.169 During discovery, parties have 
not yet gathered and marshaled all their evidence, so low-, mid-, and 
high-merit cases are hard to distinguish. Due to parties’ inability to 
signal merit level convincingly, courts are stuck with a pooling, rather 
than a separating, equilibrium.170 The only way out is for courts to 
conduct minitrials in which parties argue case merits, detailing and 
offering interpretations of the evidence,171 but the information costs 
(in time and money) of that endeavor are prohibitive for resolving a 
discovery dispute. 
A pooling equilibrium may become a separating equilibrium 
over time as more information emerges that illustrates distinctions 
among the pool—a point noted by game theory analyses of 
information problems outside the litigation context, such as analyses 
of information about product quality172 and corporate corruption.173 
 
 169. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE 
EMOTIONS 96–113 (1988) (discussing how signals can degenerate into cheap talk if listeners are 
uninformed and therefore unable to spot false signals); Michal Barzuza, Lemon Signaling in 
Cross-Listing 27 (Oct. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1022282 (discussing investor efforts to distinguish “Type L” companies more susceptible to 
corruption and “Type H” ones less susceptible and arguing that “[t]here will be a separating 
equilibrium [if and only if] Type L firms choose not to mimic Type H firms”); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements 2 
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 398, 2002), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=327842 (noting how a pooling equilibrium can be 
destabilized if “better” actors can make tangibly different offers). 
 170. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 725 (7th ed. 2007) (noting 
how pooling equilibria occur when those with higher merit find it “difficult to separate 
themselves” from those with less). 
 171. See supra Part II.B.3.c. 
 172. The classic article is George A. Akerlof’s The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, which notes that in used car markets, “bad cars drive 
out the good because they sell at the same price as good cars,” but over time better information 
emerges: 
After owning a specific car . . . the car owner can form a good idea of the quality . . . 
i.e., the owner assigns a new probability . . . that his car is a lemon. This estimate is 
more accurate than the original estimate. . . . But good cars and bad cars must still sell 
at the same price — since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference . . . . 
Akerlof, supra note 159, at 489–90; see also Alan Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure 
Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 651, 
666–67 (2000) (noting how mandatory disclosure of food nutrition content shifted a market from 
partial pooling—nondisclosure by higher-fat dressings that varied greatly, in nutritional terms—
to full separating). 
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Pretrial litigation is, at heart, a series of stages at which different 
information emerges. The paper pleadings stage, disclosing parties’ 
allegations, is followed by prediscovery dispositive motions (most 
commonly motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim174 or for 
jurisdictional failings175 or conceivably—but rarely—plaintiffs’ 
motions for judgment on the pleadings176) that disclose some of the 
parties’ legal arguments and weed out the cases whose (lack of) 
merit177 is clearest; those motions are followed by fact disclosures in 
discovery, which in turn are followed by summary judgment motions 
that further weed out weak claims, and finally followed by the trial 
that resolves remaining claims.178 
In sum, as a case progresses through the pretrial stages, it gets 
easier to distinguish it from the pool. This is why, even though most 
cases settle, some do not settle until some motion litigation or 
discovery; the outcomes of certain pretrial skirmishes, or disclosures 
in early-stage discovery (like the initial, key depositions), may allow 
parties to signal merit more meaningfully than they could earlier.179 In 
this sense, moving from one litigation stage to the next—pleadings, 
dismissal motions, discovery, and so forth—is the bearing of the 
information costs necessary to separate by merit an initially hard-to-
distinguish pool of cases. 
 
 173. See Barzuza, supra note 169, at 7–10 (discussing how a pooling equilibrium might 
become a separating equilibrium if law forces a decision on parties (that is, whether to list stock 
on an exchange imposing intrusive regulation) that high- and low-value companies decide 
differently, thereby credibly signaling their value). 
 174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 175. See id. 12(b)(1)–(2). 
 176. Motions for judgment on the pleadings are rare because “federal courts have followed 
a fairly restrictive standard in ruling on motions for judgment on the pleadings.” 5C CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368, at 222 
(3d ed. 2004) (collecting cases); see also id. § 1367, at 207–08 (“[J]udgment on the pleadings only 
has utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the pleadings 
and only questions of law remain . . . .”). 
 177. To be clear, lack of merit could mean any number of ways that a case could lose, 
whether that the allegations were false, that the allegations were true but could not be 
supported sufficiently, that the allegations were true but some form of jurisdiction was lacking, 
or any other reason. 
 178. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–14 (2002) (discussing this sequence 
of pretrial stages). 
 179. See BONE, supra note 100, at 90–91; Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New 
Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 877 (2007). 
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B. Summary Judgment as the Key “Separating” Process that Allows 
Courts to Distinguish Cases by Level of Merit (p) 
Summary judgment is the critical stage for redressing the case 
pooling equilibrium problem. Typically coming at the end of 
discovery, summary judgment is the next point, after most discovery 
disputes, when the court can meaningfully distinguish among cases. It 
is exactly the sort of minitrial—reviewing all the evidence to assess 
case merit—needed to decide discovery disputes accurately. In 
deciding summary judgment, courts allow to proceed to trial only 
claims a reasonable jury could decide either way,180 weeding out both 
claims with the lowest probability of merit (summary judgment grants 
to defendants) and claims with the highest probability (grants to 
plaintiffs). After summary judgment, the only claims left are the close 
calls in which additional evidence is most useful; summary judgment 
separates those close-call cases from the pool. 
Courts are stuck with a low-information pooling equilibrium 
until summary judgment, as illustrated by the following model. The 
estimated probability that a lawsuit is meritorious varies, as litigation 
progresses, based both on how many cases get weeded out of the pool 
at each litigation stage and on whether the reason cases are weeded 
out is that they lack merit. The following are the variables that 
influence estimates of the probability that a lawsuit is meritorious: 
let: 
d1 = fraction of cases dismissed before discovery (on motions to dismiss) 
d2 = fraction dismissed after discovery (on summary judgment motions) 
s1 = fraction settling before discovery disputes arise 
thus: 
d1 + s1  = fraction not reaching the end of discovery or summary judgment 
1 - d1 - s1 = fraction reaching the end of discovery (called “Stage II” in this 
Part) 
d1 + s1 + d2 = fraction not surviving past summary judgment motions 
1 - d1 - d2 -s1 = fraction surviving summary judgment and thus going to trial or 
settling just before trial (called “Stage III” in this Part). 
 
 180. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (allowing summary 
judgment only if no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant); Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 
F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that summary judgment is denied when the evidence, “in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could decide in 
that party’s favor”). 
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Some data and theory indicate a roughly fifty-fifty chance that 
plaintiffs will prevail in cases that reach trial after surviving 
dispositive motions (dismissal and summary judgment) and not 
settling.181 The fifty-fifty hypothesis draws legitimate criticism,182 but in 
weak form it remains useful: dispositive motions and settlements 
weed out many of the strongest and weakest claims, so the pool of 
cases reaching trial has a disproportionate share of the close-call 
claims. Whether cases reaching trial have 50 percent, 40 percent, or 30 
percent odds is immaterial, because the key insight is that whatever 
their particular odds, those odds are higher than in the pool of all 
filed cases, which includes many cases of little or no merit. Further, at 
no stage before immediately pretrial (that is, after summary 
judgment) does the court have a meaningful sense of the merits. 
Following is a discussion of what information the court has, or 
can infer, about case merit at three key stages of the path to trial: first, 
at the start of the case, before discovery, motions, or in-litigation 
settlement efforts (Stage I); next, after dismissal motions and early-
litigation settlements, including during discovery (Stage II); and next, 
after summary judgment motions (Stage III). 
1. Stage I—Start of the Case, before Discovery, Motions, or 
During-Litigation Settlements.  At this early stage, all the court knows 
is that the parties’ pleadings allege exactly opposite facts, and that 
there are various possible case outcomes: a pretrial finding that the 
case lacks sufficient merit, either on a motion to dismiss or on a 
 
 181. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 18–19 (1984) (noting that as litigation features fewer trials, “the proportion of 
plaintiff victories will approach 50 percent” under certain assumptions, such as that the 
“plaintiff and defendant possess information that is on average of equal precision, and if the 
application of legal standards is, on the whole, coherent and predictable . . . [and] to the extent 
[there is a] cost advantage of settlement over litigation”). Professors Priest and Klein collect 
“substantial evidence” for their “selection hypothesis” that cases selected for trial will tend to be 
close calls. Id. at 31–53, 55 (recounting the evidence). 
 182. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 493, 494 (1996) (“[D]ata . . . does not support a tendency toward 50 percent 
plaintiff victories.”). Professor Shavell notes that the fifty-fifty hypothesis may fail under certain 
information problems or if most lawsuits are meritorious. Id. at 494, 499–500. These conditions 
seem likeliest in certain case types, such as those that are especially uncertain, and thus hard to 
settle (or dismiss when unmeritorious), because they arise under a new law. See, e.g., Ruth 
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA 
employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. Of those cases 
that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported cases. These results are 
worse than results found in comparable areas . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
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summary judgment motion; or that the case is the sort of close call 
that will survive dismissal motions; or that the parties will settle the 
case. This intuitive sense of the range of possibilities is easily 
formalized. The probability that a case is meritorious at Stage I (PI) 
depends on the fraction of cases weeded out on dismissal and 
summary judgment (d1 and d2, respectively) and weeded out via 
settlement (s1), as well as the likelihood a settled case was meritorious 
(Ps1): 
PI=sum of the fraction of cases with each possible outcome  
multiplied by the probability a case with that outcome is meritorious 
PI = (0) (d1 +d2) + Ps1 (s1) + (.5) (1 - d1 - d2 - s1) = .5 - s1 (.5-Ps1) - .5(d1+d2) 
Accordingly, the probability a case is meritorious at the start of 
litigation (PI) is less than 0.5, except under two unlikely scenarios: (1) 
there would have to be few enough cases dismissed on motions (that 
is, low d1 + d2)  that removing good cases from the pool by settlement 
dominates the opposite effect of removing weak cases by dismissal, 
contrary to (very rough) estimates that about one-third of federal 
cases are dismissed on motions;183 and (2) settled cases would have to 
be on average highly meritorious (high Ps1), contrary to the (limited) 
data indicating that many confidential settlements are for modest 
sums.184 
Thus, judges’ likely intuition is that initially, the probability that 
a case is meritorious is low (PI < 0.5), but that assessed probability 
increases during pretrial processes, eventually reaching 0.5, or at least 
some higher level than that of the average case filed, for cases 
surviving summary judgment (Stage III). The question is whether the 
court’s estimate of case merit rises primarily from filing to the 
discovery stage (Stage I to Stage II) due to dismissal motions and 
 
 183. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
494, 511–12 (1986) (“[S]ome 35 percent of all federal cases are disposed of by rulings on motions 
for dismissal or for summary judgment.” (citing information from the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts)); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern 
Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 636 (noting, based on a collection of decades of 
government data, that the proportion of cases resolved on “dispositive motions[, including] 
dismissals on the pleadings, summary judgments, and similar rulings that end a case . . . has 
remained quite constant over fifty years at about one-third of all federal civil cases”). These 
estimates are very rough, however, and efforts at more precise estimates, such as the percentage 
dismissed on 12(b)(6) motions, have yielded quite a varied range of figures, from 2 percent to 6 
percent or higher. See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1754 (1998). 
 184. See Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential 
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 111–12, 117 (2007). 
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early settlements, or primarily from discovery to trial (Stage II to 
Stage III) as a result of summary judgment motions; as discussed 
below, it is primarily the latter. 
2. Stage II—After Dismissal Motions and Early Settlements 
(Including Settlements during Discovery).  At this stage, when most 
discovery disputes occur, the court has two pieces of information it 
lacked at the start of litigation: (1) the case survived prediscovery 
dismissal motions; and (2) it did not settle early. But early dismissals 
and settlements, taken together, clarify little about case merit. 
Dismissal motions do not weed out all low-merit lawsuits, only the 
lawsuits in which the lack of merit is sufficiently clear on paper filings, 
given that the Supreme Court has cautioned against granting such 
motions too readily.185 Settlements typically are confidential, 
preventing the court from knowing the terms of settlement or looking 
any further into the merits,186 so the court knows nothing meaningful 
about the merits of settled cases. 
The probability that a case is meritorious during discovery, Stage 
II (PII) can be estimated by noting that the probability of merit of a 
just-filed (Stage I) case is the weighted average of the following 
possibilities: (1) that a case survives to reach discovery, Stage II (the 
fraction 1 - d1 - s1 of all cases, with PII probability of merit); (2) that a 
case loses on a dismissal motion (fraction d1, which by definition has 
zero probability of merit); and (3) that a case settles early (fraction s1, 
with Ps1 probability of merit): 
PI = (PII)(1 - d1 - s1)+(0)(d1)+(Ps1)(s1 ) 
PII = (PI - Ps1s1) / (1 - d1 - s1 ) 
 
 185. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Court held that motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim rarely should be granted in employment discrimination suits, 
id. at 514–15, one of the most common lawsuit types, see infra note 234 and accompanying text 
(discussing employment cases). The Court may have shown more willingness to allow such 
dismissals in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), which dismissed an antitrust 
complaint that insufficiently alleged conspiracy, id. at 1973–74. Yet Twombly denied abrogating 
Swierkiewicz, id., and may be more of a heightened antitrust pleading standard than a major 
change to general standards for dismissal motions. 
 186. See BONE, supra note 100, at 19 (“Empirical research in this area is extremely difficult 
to conduct because most lawsuits settle and settlements mask evidence of frivolousness.”); 
Moss, supra note 179, at 867, 869 (noting the prevalence of confidentiality clauses in 
settlements). The one known study of confidential settlements found that in one federal district, 
the median confidential settlement size was $30,000 in employment discrimination and $181,500 
in personal injury, cases. Kotkin, supra note 184, at 144 & n.134. But most such settlements were 
late in litigation, after discovery or summary judgment, id. at 135, 145–49, so the study sheds 
only a little light on the merits of cases that settle early. 
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By discovery (Stage II), one knows somewhat, but not much, 
more about the probability that a case has merit. Knowing how many 
cases lose on motions to dismiss helps: the probability that a case 
reaching discovery by surviving pre-discovery motions has merit (PII) 
is higher when more cases lose on dismissal motions (that is, high d1), 
because weeding out unmeritorious cases leaves the remaining pool 
more meritorious. Although the effect of more dismissals (d1) is 
knowable, the effect of higher settlement rates (s1) is not, because we 
do not know the merits of settled cases: 
• If early settling cases are mostly unmeritorious (for example, if 
defendants mostly pay small nuisance-value settlements of a few 
thousand dollars in weak cases187), then early settlement weeds out 
weak cases, leaving the remaining pool (Stage II cases) of higher 
merit (that is, PII > PI). 
• If early settling cases are mostly meritorious (that is, if defendants 
pay mostly to avoid liability and incriminating disclosures), then 
settlement decreases the average merit of cases in discovery 
(Stage II). If the merit of settled cases (Ps1) is high, then as the 
fraction of cases that settle (s1) rises, the merit of cases reaching 
discovery (PII) falls. With dismissals weeding out the 
unmeritorious while settlements weed out the meritorious, one 
cannot say which is higher, the average merit of the pool of filed 




 187. See, e.g., Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, 162 F.3d 975, 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that the plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties” due to the size of their $2,500 to $5,000 
settlements and noting that settlement “for less than the costs of defense is a good working 
definition of a nuisance-value settlement, unless . . . the stakes of the case are themselves 
small”). See generally Moss, supra note 179, at 899–900 (noting that defendants in some cases 
“stick to a ‘nuisance-value’ offer (such as $5000)” (citing Fletcher, 162 F.3d at 976)). 
 188. With settled case merit unknown, varied settlement frequency has indeterminate 
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 In short, between filing and discovery (Stage I and Stage II), 
dismissal motions weed out weak cases while settlements weed out 
cases of unclear merit. It seems likely that the dismissal of weak cases 
dominates the theoretically possible effect of settling strong cases,189 
which would mean that Stage II cases have higher average merit (PII > 
PI). But with so little information about settlements,
190 one cannot 
make any truly confident statements. Accordingly, courts face much 
the same dearth of information about cases in discovery (Stage II) 
that they face as to just-filed cases (Stage I). 
3. Stage III—After Summary Judgment Motions.  At this stage, as 
discussed above, theory and data suggest that the remaining cases 
have a roughly fifty-fifty probability of merit (that is, PIII = 0.5), or at 
least have higher average merit than cases earlier in litigation, such as 
newly filed cases.191 With case merit largely unknowable at filing 
(Stage I) and during discovery (Stage II), Stage III—after summary 
judgment—is the first point in time at which courts meaningfully can 
assess case merit, and therefore the first point when cases exist largely 
in a separating rather than a pooling equilibrium. It is the stage when 
courts finally can know enough about case merit to decide discovery 
disputes accurately. 
Yet delaying discovery decisions until summary judgment seems 
to conjure up the hole-in-the-bucket problem again: summary 
judgment should base on all the evidence, so how can evidence-
gathering decisions wait until summary judgment? As discussed in 
Section C, there is room for a narrow but important practice of 
making some discovery decisions after summary judgment. 
C. The Prescription: In Close Calls, Preserving the Evidence but 
Delaying the Discovery until after Summary Judgment 
Because summary judgment motions ideally are evaluations of 









> 0 only if Ps1 is higher than PI discounted by the fraction of cases not dismissed. 
 189. For a discussion of the evidence of high rates of dismissals of weak cases and of the 
limited value of settled cases, see supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 191. For a discussion of the Priest-Klein hypothesis and its critics, see supra notes 181–82 
and accompanying text. 
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in discovery.192 Summary judgment before discovery closes is, and 
should be, exceptional because “discovery should precede 
consideration of dispositive motions when the facts sought to be 
discovered are relevant to consideration of the particular motion.”193 
For this reason, the summary judgment rule provides that if 
additional discovery is reasonably available, courts should not grant 
summary judgment without that discovery, but instead should “deny 
the motion [or] order a continuance to enable . . . other discovery to 
be undertaken.”194 Courts granting summary judgment before 
completion of discovery risk reversal, as in Gary Plastic Packaging 
Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,195 which 
explained why complete discovery should precede a grant of summary 
judgment: 
While summary judgment is a valuable procedural device . . . it is 
also a drastic remedy that cuts off the right to have one’s day in 
court. The harshness of the remedy is exacerbated when the trial 
court refuses to allow plaintiff to conduct discovery. Discovery 
serves important purposes, such as . . . fully disclosing the nature and 
scope of the controversy . . . framing the issues involved, and 
enabling parties to obtain the factual information needed to prepare 
for trial. . . . [S]ummary judgment should be sparingly 
granted . . . when discovery is incomplete and . . . defendants have 
 
 192. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Curtis, 189 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[L]eaving the 
question of the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ case as a matter of law to a point after discovery closes is 
the way in which the federal courts handle such matters. Therefore, plaintiffs are correct . . . that 
they are not required to establish a legally sufficient case . . . of the applicability of [the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act] . . . as a condition of securing discovery and that resolution of the 
legal issues concerning that applicability is premature until discovery ends.” (emphases added)); 
Bone & Evans, supra note 91, at 1284 (“[T]he procedural system seems to favor postponing a 
serious evidentiary review until after substantial discovery has been completed. Summary 
judgment, for example, usually takes place only after the parties have had ample opportunity to 
uncover information and evidence.”). 
 193. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 84 F.R.D. 278, 282 (D. Del. 1979) (citing 
Canavan v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 553 F.2d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also United States v. 
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1115–16 (D.N.J. 1983) (“[W]here a plaintiff must obtain a good deal of 
information from the opposing party, judgment should be withheld until the discovery process 
has been completed.” (citing Nat’l Life Ins. v. Solomon, 529 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1975))); 
Concord Labs., Inc. v. Concord Med. Ctr., 552 F. Supp. 549, 554 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that if 
a case entails “knowledge and intent” issues, “material evidence is almost entirely in the hands 
of the defendants, and where plaintiff can establish a fair likelihood that it can obtain material 
evidence through discovery, we think it unfair to grant defendants summary judgment until 
plaintiff has had a full opportunity”). 
 194. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
 195. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 
230 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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exclusive possession of the material facts.196 
Consequently, there is good reason that “[m]ost courts are reluctant 
to grant summary judgment prior to the termination of discovery.”197 
But putting summary judgment after all discovery is just a 
commonsense convention, not a rule. “‘[T]here is no requirement in 
Rule 56 . . . that summary judgment not be entered until discovery is 
complete.’”198 In appropriate cases, courts entertain limited-scope 
summary judgment motions after only partial discovery; examples 
include motions for summary judgment limited to threshold questions 
like a governmental defendant’s claim of immunity from suit199 or a 
libel defendant’s assertion that only limited evidence is necessary to 
undercut the plaintiff’s required showing that the allegedly libelous 
statement was false.200 
In certain cases, some burdensome discovery could be allowed 
only after summary judgment. The main import of this suggestion is 
not that more discovery often should be delayed. Rather, it is that in a 
meritorious case, certain burdensome discovery is regularly denied—
and must be denied because courts cannot tell whether the case is 
meritorious (and therefore is deserving of more discovery than usual) 
during the pooling equilibrium that exists before summary judgment. 
 
 196. Id. at 236 (citations omitted); accord Weiss v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 91 F. App’x 683, 690 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Weiss has not had ample opportunity for discovery[, which] . . . . was stayed 
pending resolution of Reebok’s summary judgment motion that was narrowly focused on the 
structural aspects [of the disputed shoes] . . . Weiss should be granted the time that all litigants 
receive to gather . . . evidence that the accused shoes can perform the claimed functions.”); 
Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[The] court should have 
allowed full discovery [to] . . . allow[] the Bank a fair opportunity to present all available 
material evidence pertinent to its opposition to . . . summary judgment.”). 
 197. Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1115. 
 198. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1081 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also Paul 
Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1029–30 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[A] plaintiff’s 
entitlement to discovery prior to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not unlimited, 
and may be cut off when the record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce 
the facts needed by plaintiff to withstand . . . summary judgment.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Moore v. Busby, 92 F. App’x 699, 702 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district 
court was permitted to stay discovery pending disposition of the summary judgment motion by 
the defendant, a judge, on the threshold question of his immunity from suit as a judge). 
 200. See, e.g., Living Will Ctr. v. NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc., 857 P.2d 514, 520 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that “[l]imited discovery on the issue of falsity is therefore appropriate” 
before summary judgment motion because “discovery pertaining to defendants’ state of 
mind . . . is not pertinent to the issue of falsity. . . . [and] the issue of falsity . . . [entails] 
production only of several hours of original unedited video and audio tapes and internal 
production memoranda and records”), rev’d on other grounds, 879 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1994). 
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In such a case, the summary judgment denial is a determination that 
the case is one in which more discovery is warranted than in the 
broader pool of all cases in discovery; it is a determination that 
relatively more discovery is warranted than the court could have 
assumed during discovery. 
Notably, courts’ existing broad case-management powers over 
discovery and summary judgment make a new rule technically 
unnecessary. There already is “a great deal of discretionary power in 
the trial court” as to discovery,201 including as to “controlling and 
scheduling of discovery”202 and “determining the appropriateness and 
timing of summary adjudication under Rule 56.”203 Some courts 
already order that discovery occur in stages, such as by issuing a 
scheduling order at a Rule 16 pretrial conference (which occurs early 
in litigation) and requiring a certain order of discovery devices (like 
document disclosures before depositions) and discovery topics (like 
fact discovery before expert witness discovery).204 Sequencing any 
discovery after summary judgment, though, remains rare.205 
More broadly, there has been an increasing trend—away from 
deeming all discovery to occur at once, in a single discovery phase of 
the lawsuit and toward timing discovery based on the outcome of 
certain motions or the outcome of initial limited discovery. For 
example, by statute (the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act206), 
in securities fraud cases courts presumptively stay discovery207 pending 
 
 201. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 34 
(2004) (noting that judges at the trial court level “are permitted to make discretionary rulings 
with respect to discovery” and other matters); see also Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward 
Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1587–90 (2003) (discussing the procedural discretion 
of district courts in case-management activities, including discovery matters). 
 202. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F). 
 203. Id. 16(c)(2)(E). 
 204. See id. 16 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he initial disclosures required by Rule 
26(a)(1) will ordinarily have been made before entry of the scheduling order, [and] the timing 
and sequence for disclosure of expert testimony and of the witnesses and exhibits to be used at 
trial should be tailored to the circumstances of the case and is a matter that should be 
considered at the initial scheduling conference.”). 
 205. See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text. 
 206. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 207. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, all 
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to 
dismiss . . . .”). 
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dismissal motions that face a heightened pleading standard;208 by 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, courts 
adjudicating class actions commonly grant limited discovery prior to 
the motion for class certification and the rest of discovery only when 
and if the motion is granted;209 and courts facing discovery motions 
about costly e-discovery sometimes order sampling of a limited 
amount of the data to help determine whether later discovery of the 
remainder is warranted. In the securities context, one commentator 
has observed that the statutory stay of discovery “credentials suits 
that survive pretrial motions,”210 a concept similar to this Article’s 
broader point that surviving a dispositive motion serves to separate 
out of the pool those lawsuits most deserving of broader discovery. 
In short, if a court denies costly discovery when a case is hard to 
distinguish from the pool of all cases in discovery (Stage II), it should 
reconsider that denial of discovery if the case survives summary 
judgment (that is, reaches Stage III). Surviving summary judgment 
separates a case from a broader pool (all cases in discovery) into a 
narrower one (cases reaching trial). More specifically, a summary 
judgment denial means a reasonable jury could decide either way. In 
other words, p is roughly 0.5—higher than in most cases, which means 
that more evidence is more valuable than in most cases (that is, Δp of 
additional evidence is high). The key problem courts face in deciding 
discovery disputes is that they would need minitrials to assess case 
merit sufficiently; summary judgment is the existing point in litigation 
when the court already undertakes that effort. In deciding summary 
judgment, the court is bearing the information costs necessary to 
switch from a pooling equilibrium (where p and Δp are hard to 
discern) to a separating equilibrium (where it is clearer which are 
 
 208. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring that plaintiffs identify each false or misleading statement 
and specify why each was false or misleading). 
 209. See, e.g., Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878 (N.D. Iowa 2008) 
(“The court limited discovery to class certification issues, and set deadlines for the parties’ briefs 
related to class action and collective action certification.”); Hoving v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 
545 F. Supp. 2d 662, 670–71 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[D]iscovery may commence immediately, but it 
shall be limited to class certification issues. Discovery must be relevant to the issues of class 
certification, including numerosity, typicality, commonality, adequacy of representation, and the 
definition of a proposed class.”); In re Sonus Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 244, 252 (D. 
Mass. 2007) (“This case, of course, is not yet at the summary judgment stage, and [the court] 
cannot determine the merits of the case based upon the limited discovery that has taken place 
for the purposes of class certification.”). 
 210. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 
520 (1997). 
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high-p, high-Δp cases). Based on this analysis, courts’ efforts to assess 
case merit on summary judgment can serve double duty, helping 
courts decide discovery disputes that, earlier in litigation, they had 
trouble deciding because case merit and evidentiary value was 
unclear. 
D. The Devil is in the Details: Making Workable the Proposal for 
Post–Summary Judgment Revisiting of Discovery the Court Had 
Denied Earlier 
In proposing a different way for courts to handle nuts-and-bolts 
practical matters like discovery disputes, the details matter. This 
Section discusses five legitimate concerns about this Article’s 
proposal and responds to those concerns by fleshing out how this 
proposal best could be implemented. 
1. Concern Number One: Summary Judgment May Not Clarify 
Case Merits. 
A denial of summary judgment does not always mean a case is a close 
call; weak cases can survive summary judgment when they are fact 
intensive or depend on debatable inferences from the facts. 
This Article’s premise is that cases surviving summary judgment 
have higher odds of success and are more likely to be the close calls, 
than the broader pool of all filed cases. Yet some summary judgment 
denials do not indicate such odds. Decisions denying summary 
judgment sometimes actually say that the case “barely” survives 
summary judgment,211 or that it does so despite “weak” evidence.212 
Further, summary judgment “is not commonly interposed, and even 
less frequently granted,” in certain areas of law. For example, in 
negligence lawsuits, “the judge and jury each have a specialized 
 
 211. E.g., Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“There is no rich mosaic of circumstantial evidence of retaliation in this case, but there is 
enough (though maybe barely enough) to preclude summary judgment.”); Smith v. Mattox, 127 
F.3d 1416, 1419–20 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the evidence of excessive use of force was 
“barely” enough because the “hazy border between permissible and forbidden force is marked 
by a multifactored, case-by-case balancing test,” precluding a ruling on the level of force “within 
the confines of summary judgment review”). 
 212. E.g., MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 329 F.3d 986, 1008 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Although the evidence of the financial harm to MetroNet is weak, it is sufficient to withstand 
summary judgment.”), rev’d sub nom. MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 739 F. Supp. 1268, 1293 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (“Plaintiffs’ 
evidence . . . is weak, but it appears to be just enough to get them past summary judgment.”). 
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function”;213 such cases often turn on pure factual disputes (for 
example, drivers disputing who entered an intersection first) or 
reasonableness and due care inquiries fuzzy enough that even in cases 
that seem weak, it is hard for the court to say no reasonable jury 
could find for the plaintiff. The same may hold for other areas of law 
featuring similar reasonableness tests like unreasonable use of force 
by police.214 
But a party’s ability to avoid summary judgment by citing factual 
disputes is less than it once was. Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court 
has “signal[ed] to the lower courts that summary judgment can be 
relied upon more so than in the past to weed out frivolous lawsuits 
and avoid wasteful trials, and the lower courts have responded 
accordingly.”215 As one much-cited case noted, courts “cannot resolve 
factual disputes that could go to a jury at trial, but weak factual claims 
can be weeded out through summary judgment motions,” because the 
mere “existence of a triable [fact] issue” is insufficient to avoid 
summary judgment; “the triable issue must be evaluated in its factual 
context, which suggests that the test for summary judgment is whether 
sufficient evidence exists in the pre-trial record.”216 Similarly, 
the fact that a summary judgment is difficult to obtain in actions in 
which the parties’ states of mind are relevant does not mean that it 
will never be granted . . . . [S]ummary judgment has been granted to 
defendants in suits involving fraud, conspiracy, and other claims 
turning on state of mind when plaintiffs’ allegations were not 
sufficiently supported.217  
 
 213. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2729, at 533 (3d ed. 1998). 
 214. See, e.g., Smith, 127 F.3d at 1419–20 (“[W]e cannot within the confines of summary 
judgment review hold the force not obviously unreasonable.”). 
 215. 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 213, § 2727, at 468–69 (footnotes omitted). 
 216. Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1988); see also 
Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver., L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995) (deeming 
the “mere existence of some disputed facts” insufficient, because “the quality and quantity of 
the evidence offered to create a question of fact must be adequate to support a jury verdict 
[and] if the evidence is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative,’ it may not be adequate 
to oppose entry of summary judgment” (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986))). 
 217. 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 213, § 2730, at 40–43 (footnotes omitted) (collecting 
cases); see also Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Cases 
involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.”). 
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Thus, courts do meaningfully assess case merit on summary 
judgment even on claims that are quite fact specific or that turn on 
state of mind. 
Still, with some weak cases surviving summary judgment, this 
Article’s proposal will not be useful in every case surviving summary 
judgment. It is unsurprising that this Article’s proposal is imperfect 
because its premise is that there is no perfect fix. Judges make 
suboptimal discovery decisions not because they are bad at their jobs 
or because the rules are badly written, but because of the nature of 
the information-timing problem: courts lack sufficient information on 
case merit and evidentiary value to make optimal discovery decisions. 
When summary judgment denials do not indicate case merit, 
judges should not, and will not, view that denial as sufficiently 
informative to affect their prior discovery rulings. Such uninformative 
summary judgment denials mean that the pooling equilibrium, in 
which judges have too little information to make optimal discovery 
decisions, will persist until trial, because summary judgment does not 
move the case from a pooling equilibrium into a separating 
equilibrium consisting mainly of higher-than-average merit close-call 
cases warranting more discovery. But the judge will know this; after 
all, the judge, having sifted through each party’s evidence and 
arguments to assess how a reasonable jury could rule, is well 
positioned to know whether the summary judgment denial was or was 
not based on the merits of the case. 
Consequently, the fact that some summary judgment denials do 
not indicate case merit means this proposal will not be useful in all 
cases. Importantly, though, it does not create a risk of bad post–
summary judgment discovery grants, because judges will know when 
their summary judgment denials indicate enough about case merit to 
warrant reconsideration of their denials of discovery. 
2. Concern Number Two: Courts Should Use Alternatives Such as 
Sampling and Cost Shifting. 
When courts hesitate to allow potentially relevant but costly discovery, 
they need not postpone it until summary judgment, because they have 
two alternatives more in conformity with existing discovery practice: 
ordering cost shifting that allows the discovery only if the requesting 
party is willing to pay some or all of the cost; or ordering a partial 
sampling of high-volume discovery. 
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Sampling and cost shifting are useful discovery tools but, as 
discussed in this Section, they are not a panacea and do not eliminate 
the information-timing problem that makes post–summary judgment 
discovery potentially useful. 
One tool courts do use is sampling, allowing discovery of a 
fraction of the data first, then discovery of the rest of the data if the 
sample proves to contain promising evidence:218 
A phased approach will allow the Court to engage in a more 
meaningful benefit-burden analysis before determining whether to 
require cost-shifting . . . . After Defendant restores a portion of the 
back-up tapes . . . Plaintiff will then have the opportunity . . . to 
determine if it contains relevant evidence and if additional 
restoration of back-up tapes is warranted. . . . [R]estoration of one-
fourth . . . should be adequate to determine whether the tapes are 
likely to possess relevant evidence.219 
Yet sampling is useful only if two conditions both hold: first, the 
sample must be much cheaper than all the evidence (which is not true 
if the main cost is finding a way to read old data); second, the key 
evidence must be likely to be present in a small sample (which is not 
true if a plaintiff seeks just one key e-mail, because its absence from a 
sample will prove nothing). Sampling is only a limited fix because of 
these conditions and because it does not redress the main problem—
courts’ difficulty deciding whether to allow costly discovery before 
seeing much evidence. 
Cost shifting, whether under the rules220 or to a greater degree,221 
gives courts a wider range of options for costly discovery than “yes, 
you can obtain it” and “no, you cannot”—but it is a limited fix that 
does not resolve the information-timing problem. To begin with, 
requiring requesting parties to pay for responding parties’ production 
costs jeopardizes nonwealthy plaintiffs’ ability to serve the important 
social function of suing to unearth and redress important violations of 
 
 218. For cases requiring sampling of high-volume deleted data, see Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 281–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 
F.R.D. 31, 34–35 (D.D.C. 2001); AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 443–44 
(2007). 
 219. AAB Joint Venture, 75 Fed. Cl. at 443–44 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 220. As to cost-shifting rules, see supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. As to cost-
shifting case law, see infra notes 238–53 and accompanying text. 
 221. See sources cited supra note 78. 
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law.222 More fundamentally, allowing cost shifting in limited 
circumstances does not eliminate courts’ need to make difficult-to-
impossible decisions about the value of requested discovery. 
That is, even with more cost shifting, courts still would face 
information-intensive decisions about which discovery is (1) 
sufficiently important that the requesting party should get it without 
paying production costs; (2) important enough that the requesting 
party could get it by paying production costs; or (3) sufficiently 
lacking in value that the requesting party cannot get it even if willing 
to pay for it. Such decisions remain intractable in many cases because 
(as is this Article’s primary diagnosis about the problem of costly 
discovery) courts often lack sufficient information about case value 
and evidentiary value to undertake accurate cost-benefit analyses on 
discovery disputes. 
In sum, both sampling and cost shifting have their place as 
important tools that, in some cases, can help courts expand their 
options for discovery rulings. Similarly, it is commendable that the 
2000 e-discovery amendments to Rule 26 emphasized efforts to 
achieve cooperation among the parties in place of judicial resolution. 
Most notably, those amendments require that the parties’ out-of-
court discovery planning conference223 include “any issues about 
disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including 
the form or forms in which it should be produced.”224 Given the 
limited potential of judicial rulings to manage discovery with perfect 
accuracy, it makes sense for the rules to encourage parties to obviate 
the need for such discovery rulings as much as possible. But although 
all of these tools—sampling, cost shifting, and precourt resolution—
could reduce the frequency of the information-timing problem this 
Article diagnoses, none of them truly can eliminate it from all cases. 
Accordingly, alternative proposals are complements, not substitutes, 
for this Article’s proposal. 
 
 222. See Hay, supra note 97, at 502 (discussing how discovery helps plaintiffs prove and 
redress illegality). 
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1)–(3) (requiring parties, in advance of their in-court scheduling 
conference, to meet by themselves to try to reach agreement on a discovery plan before court 
intervention). 
 224. Id. 26(f)(3)(C). 
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3. Concern Number Three: Judges Might Excessively Deny 
Discovery and Grant Summary Judgment 
Judges might respond to this proposal by denying more discovery (as 
a way out of difficult proportionality decisions) and by granting 
summary judgment more often (both to avoid cumbersome post–
summary judgment discovery and because plaintiffs will be less able 
to obtain evidence they need to oppose summary judgment). 
This concern is real; as has been argued about the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act provisions requiring a stay of 
discovery pending dismissal motions facing a heightened pleading 
standard, “[t]he lack of discovery will hobble the potentially 
meritorious suit from withstanding a test of its pleadings by denying 
the plaintiff access to information necessary to specifically plead a 
violation by the defendant.”225 For four reasons, however, this concern 
should not be overstated. 
First, a court using this Article’s proposal to deny too much 
discovery risks reversal on appeal. Although courts cannot always 
allow all the discovery parties want before summary judgment, 
appellate courts do enforce the rule requiring as full discovery as 
possible before summary judgment, reversing courts that grant 
summary judgment after unduly denying discovery.226 Courts are 
aware of this presumption that pre–summary judgment discovery 
should be as full as possible; this awareness would not disappear if 
courts adopt this Article’s proposal. 
Second, this Article does not suggest postponing most e-
discovery. The media focus on the costliest cases,227 but much e-
discovery is modest and should remain part of standard (pre–
summary judgment) discovery. A simple, nontechnical search can 
respond to a request for all e-mails with certain text;228 some “deleted” 
 
 225. Cox, supra note 210, at 520. 
 226. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text. 
 227. Janet Novack, Control/alt/discover, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 60, 60 (telling how one e-
discovery consultant charged over $1 million for a court-ordered search of 50,000 tapes, which 
the consultant cast as “blackmail” (by the plaintiff, not the consultant), and a violation of some 
“‘gentleman’s agreement’ not to go after each other’s electronic data” among lawyers generally 
(quoting John Jessen, President, Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc.)). 
 228. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (“[S]imply . . . create a plain language search. . . . [for] ‘header’ information, such as the 
date or the name of the sender or . . . the text of the e-mail . . . . UBS personnel could easily run 
a search for e-mails containing the words ‘Laura’ or ‘Zubulake.’”). 
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e-mails remain easily accessible on company servers;229 and some 
backup file restoration is affordable.230 Even costly discovery like 
many deleted files, or “metadata” in fraud cases addressing when a 
document was created or altered,231 need not always be delayed 
because courts can initially allow a partial sample.232 
Third, the exact impact of this Article’s proposal—more 
discovery or less, greater or lesser discovery cost—is hard to predict 
because postponing some discovery will create multiple, sometimes 
conflicting strategic effects. With some discovery postponed until 
after summary judgment, there could be (a) less discovery overall 
(because courts could eliminate certain costly discovery for some 
cases losing on summary judgment) or more discovery overall 
(because cases surviving summary judgment would enjoy especially 
intensive discovery), and (b) more discovery disputes (because there 
would be arguments over what discovery gets postponed), the same 
number of discovery disputes (because arguments over what gets 
postponed already reach the courts, as arguments over whether to 
allow or disallow the discovery), or fewer discovery disputes (because 
postponing certain discovery postpones any follow-up disputes, such 
as disputes about the extent of the data production). If there is a net 
decrease in discovery cost (the cost of discovery as well as of 
discovery disputes), that would decrease settlement incentives, which 
would increase the number of cases undergoing costly discovery—
partially countering the decrease in discovery cost. In contrast, if 
there is a net increase in discovery cost, that too would have 
competing incentive effects: increasing parties’ incentives to settle 
early, before much discovery (which would decrease the number of 
cases with costly discovery) but also increasing the incentive to file 
frivolous lawsuits that defendants would settle to avoid discovery 
costs. In short, this (or any other) discovery reform proposal could 
 
 229. For example, this author has no technical skills but once recovered many “deleted” e-
mails that remained accessible from university servers in an e-mail account subfolder. 
 230. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638, 640 (D. Kan. 2006) (rejecting 
an argument that e-mails on backup tapes were not readily accessible when the estimated cost 
was $3,374.95). 
 231. See Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 22 (comments of James C. Francis IV, J., United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York) (noting that “metadata” includes 
“changes to the document over time [and] who the author of the document is,” as well as when 
the computer was used on the document, which may help assess “the authenticity of documents” 
and a party’s “intent . . . in drafting” them). 
 232. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 240, 249 and 
accompanying text. 
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have varied and dynamic effects—some effects foreseeable but others 
not, and some effects in conflict with others. As with any change to a 
complex system, there is reason to be cautious and humble in making 
predictions as to the ultimate mix of effects. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the sort of costly 
discovery that courts likely would postpone under this Article’s 
proposal is the sort that courts already deny in many cases. 
Consequently, this Article’s main impact would be to give parties a 
better chance at costly discovery—just later, after summary judgment. 
In addition to cases denying relevant discovery due to cost,233 e-
discovery decisions in employment cases (which are 12–14 percent of 
federal civil cases)234 show that the best-case scenario for a plaintiff in 
even a high-value case may be a court order allowing costly e-
discovery only with cost shifting, that is, only if the plaintiff pays an 
often prohibitively high share of the defendant’s production costs. 
Consider Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III).235 Title 
VII (employment discrimination) monetary relief is only lost pay plus 
capped emotional distress and punitive damages,236 but Zubulake’s 
potential damages “undoubtedly” were “higher than [those in] the 
vast majority of Title VII” cases: with millions in lost pay, the plaintiff 
claimed damages of roughly $15 to $19 million, and the defendant 
counterestimated approximately $1.2 million.237 Though the more 
than $165,000 e-discovery cost was “surely not ‘significantly 
disproportionate’” to the case value and “weigh[ed] against cost-
shifting,” the court still shifted 25 percent of that cost to the 
plaintiff,238 even though the evidence was relevant and the plaintiff 
made a “limited and targeted request” for e-mails about her sent to or 
from five individuals.239 The defendant initially produced a small 
sample, five of ninety-four backup tapes, and “a review of these e-
mails reveal[ed] that they [were] relevant” to Zubulake’s claim of 
 
 233. For a collection of cases denying seemingly relevant discovery due to cost, see supra 
notes 84–85, 88. 
 234. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69 
MO. L. REV. 365, 369 & n.27 (2004) (noting that such cases “also substantially increased in many 
state courts”). 
 235. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 236. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006) (capping emotional distress and punitive damages at 
$50,000 to $300,000). 
 237. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 281, 288 (recounting that Zubulake had earned a $650,000 
annual salary as an equities trader at a New York securities firm). 
 238. Id. at 287–88, 291. 
 239. Id. at 281–82, 285. 
